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1. Richard C. Marston
Exchange Rate Policy Reconsidered
I would regard it as a catastrophe amounting to a world tragedy
if [this conference should] ... allow itself to be diverted by the
proposal of a purely artificial and temporary experiment affecting
the monetary exchange ofa few nations only. . . . The sound internal
economic system ofa nation is a greater factor in its well-being than
the price ofits currency in changing terms ofthe currencies ofother
nations. (From President Franklin D. Roosevelt's message to the
London Economic Conference of 1933)
It has been our task to find a common measure, a common standard,
a common rule applicable to each and not irksome to any. . . . [W]e
have perhaps accomplished here in Bretton Woods something more
than what is embodied in this Final Act. We have shown that a
concourse of44 nations are actually able to work together at a con-
structive task in amity and unbroken accord. (J. M. Keynes at the
conclusion of the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944)1
The Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, which fixed exchange rates
for over twenty-five years, is often cited as a model of economic co-
operation among countries. Indeed, the Bretton Woods agreement on
exchange rates was a remarkable accomplishment, particularly when
measured against the failures ofearlierconferences such as the London
Economic Conference of1933. Yet overfifteen years have elapsed since
the breakdownofthe BrettonWoods systemwithoutany serious efforts
to restore fixed exchange rates among the currencies of the major
industrial countries. The last attempt to reconstruct the exchange rate
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system, the Smithsonian agreement of December 1971, broke down
almost immediately. Recent Economic Summits have agreed on ad hoc
policies to counterexchange rate movements and have consideredmod-
est proposals to modify the existing system, but these Summits have
made no progress on more systemic changes in exchange rate arrange-
ments. Governments may have refrained from "reforming" the system
for good reasons. This paper will consider arguments for and against
more far-reaching international agreements on exchange rate policy.
When considering possible reforms of the exchange rate system, it
is natural to compare experience since 1973 with that of the Bretton
Woods period. The difference in economic performance between the
two periods would be startling if it were not so well known. Table 2.1
updates a table presented in Goldstein (1984, 10) that compares recent
inflation rates, growth rates, and other economic variables with those
of the Bretton Woods period. The period since 1973 is divided in two
parts to highlight more recent developments in the 1980s.
Regardless ofwhich indicator is chosen, the decade ofthe 1960s was
a time of much superior economic performance. During the 1960s,
inflation was markedly lower in all major industrial countries, with the
Table 2.1 Comparison of Macroeconomic Performance in Three
Recent Periods
U.S. Canada Japan France Germany Italy U.K.
Average
Inflation Rates
1961-71 2.8 2.7 5.6 4.1 2.8 3.9 4.4
1973-80 8.5 8.7 9.5 10.1 4.9 14.9 14.0
1981-85 5.3 7.2 2.7 9.1 3.8 12.9 6.9
Average GNP
Growth Rates
1961-71 3.6 5.2 10.4 5.4 4.2 5.2 2.8
1973-80 2.5 3.4 4.1 3.1 2.5 3.3 1.8
1981-85a 2.4 2.2 3.8 1.2 1.2 0.4 1.7
Average
Productivity Growth
1961-71 2.9 4.5 9.8 6.4 5.5 6.5 3.8
1973-80 1.6 2.1 6.1 4.6 4.0 4.6 1.8
1981-85 3.7 2.4 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.5 5.0
Average
Unemployment Rates
1961-71 4.8 4.9 1.2 1.6 0.8 5.1 2.6
1973-80 6.6 7.0 1.9 4.5 2.9 6.6 4.9
1981-85 8.3 10.4 2.5 8.7 7.1 9.6 11.9
Sources: CPI indexes and GNP: IMP, International Financial Statistics; productivity:
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics; unemployment rates: OECD, Labor Force Statistics.
aUntil 1984 for Italy.81 Exchange Rate Coordination
notable exception ofJapan where inflation in the 1980s is half what it
was in the 1960s. A more recent trend toward lower inflation rates,
however, is observed by comparing the 1981-85 and 1973-80 periods.
Figure 2.1, illustrating the annual inflation rates for the three largest
industrial economies, confirms this downward trend and also suggests
that inflation rates for these countries may be converging. But these
recent favorable trends in inflation are not matched by similar trends
in output and other variables. Real growth in GNP was higher during
the 1960s in all countries. Productivity growth was higher in all coun-
tries during the 1960s than during the 1973-85 period as a whole,
although in the United States and in the United Kingdom productivity
growth during the 1980s has exceeded that of the 1960s.2 Finally, un-
employment rates were in an entirely different range during the 1960s.
In Germany, for example, unemployment averaged only 0.8 percent in
the 1960s, but 2.9 percent in the 1970s, and a depressingly high 7.1
percent in the 1980s. In the United Kingdom, a 2.6 percent unemploy-
ment rate during the 1960s has turned into an 11.9 percent rate in the
1980s. Compared with the recent period of flexible exchange rates,
therefore, the 1960s appear to have been a golden era of economic
performance.
Yet we should hesitate before attributing recent economic perfor-
mance to the switch from fixed to flexible exchange rates. Although
flexible rates may help to explain high inflation rates in the 1970s, it is
much more difficult to tie growth rates, unemployment rates, or pro-
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Nor is it easy to say how the fixed rate system would have petformed
in response to the economic disturbances of the 1970s and 1980s, in-
cluding the two oil shocks and the sharp changes in macroeconomic
policies undertaken in Britain and the United States. Rather than try
to account for this gap in economic petformance, orto speculate about
how a different exchange rate system might have petformed, this paper
will focus on the choices that are presented to policymakers today.
One ofthese choices is to return to fixed exchange rates, but in today's
economic environment this may prove as difficult as putting Humpty
Dumpty together again.
This paper addresses a number ofissues important to exchange rate
policy:
Exchange rate variability: Section 2.1 examines the problem that
exchange rate policy is designed to address, exchange rate variability.
It distinguishes between two types of exchange rate variability, the
short-run volatility of exchange rates characteristic of all asset prices
and the misalignment ofexchange rates which may persist for several
years at a time. This distinction is crucial to an understanding of ex-
change rate policy, since actions designed to reduce volatility may not
be well suited to countering misalignments.
Role of sterilized intervention: Casual observers may regard ex-
change market intervention as the primary tool ofexchange rate policy,
yet existing evidence raises doubts about the effectiveness of inter-
vention unaccompanied by changes in money supplies. Section 2.2
reviews existing statisticalevidenceonso-called sterilizedintervention,
then studies two recent episodes of foreign exchange intervention in
November 1978 and September 1985.
Fixed exchange rates: Those who look on the Bretton Woods system
with nostalgia may not recall how that system actually performed in
practice. Section 2.3 examines arguments for and against fixed ex-
change rates in general. It then reviews experience under the Bretton
Woods system as well as the recently established European Monetary
System (EMS).
Rulesfor managedfloating: Section 2.4 considers various proposals
for managing exchange rates, including the rules adopted by the In-
ternational Monetary Fund in 1978. One ambitious scheme for ex-
change rate management involves establishing target zones for the ma-
jor currencies. Target zones are examined in detail because of the
attentiongiventothemin recentgovernmentandacademic discussions.
2.1 The Problem of Exchange Rate Variability
Variable exchange rates pose problems for an economy, butthe prob-
lems vary widely depending on the nature of the variability. A useful83 Exchange Rate Coordination
distinction can be drawn between two types of variability: volatility
and misalignment. Volatility is the day-to-day, month-to-month vari-
ability of exchange rates, a variability that may have no trend to it.
Misalignment, in contrast, is the persistent departure of an exchange
rate from its long-run competitive level. Misalignment thus refers not
to month-to-month variability but to longer-lasting movements of ex-
change rates, and only to those movements that depart from relative
price trends, thus altering the relative competitiveness of a country's
goods.3 This distinction is important for intervention policy because a
case might be made that only one form of variability is harmful and
therefore might justify intervention. It must be admitted at the outset,
however, that this distinction between the two forms ofexchange rate
variability is more easily made in theory than in practice, since ex-
change rates may exhibit their greatest volatility during periods of
misalignment.
2.1.1 Volatility
One of the lessons learned from the voluminous literature on ex-
change rate behavior written in the 1970s is that exchange rates behave
like asset prices, displaying much more volatility than most macro-
economic variables such as output or the prices ofgoods and services.4
This is not surprising given the dominance of asset trades in the de-
termination of exchange rates. Table 2.2 examines the volatility of
Table 2.2 Standard Deviations of Monthly Percentage Changes in Exchange



















Japan France Germany U.K.
0.0274 0.0279 0.0288 0.0255
0.0256 0.0272 0.0302 0.0271
0.0229 0.0120 0.0113 0.0195
0.0208 0.0116 0.0118 0.0197
0.0094 0.0037 0.0039 0.0081
0.0106 0.0123 0.0078 0.0090
0.0294 0.0580 0.0315 0.0597
Cotton Rice Tin Wheat
0.0656 0.0700 0.0546 0.0646
Sources: Monthly series: IMF, International Financial Statistics tape. Trade weights:
Morgan Guaranty Trust, World Financial Markets.
aAll bilateral comparisons are vis-a-vis the United States.
bReal exchange rates are measured using wholesale price indexes.
cEffective exchange rates are weighted averages of ten countries' exchange rates (G-5
plus Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland); weights are based on
total trade (imports plus exports) in manufactures.84 R. C. Marston/G. Carli/J. Attali/J. R. Petty/R. Solomon
exchange rates using one measure of volatility, the standard deviation
of monthly percentage changes in exchange rates.5 This measure of
volatility, suggested by Lanyi and Suss (1982), counts as variable only
those movements in exchange rates that depart from an average trend
(measured as a percentage change).
Volatility Comparisons
Table 2.2 compares the volatility ofexchange rates with the volatility
of price ratios based on two aggregate price indexes, the Consumer
Price Index (CPI) and the Wholesale Price Index (WPI), for the so-
called Group of5 (G-5) industrial countries: France, Germany, Japan,
United Kingdom, and United States. According to this table, bilateral
exchange rates are more than twice as volatile as these price ratios, in
some cases more than five times as volatile.6 This should not be sur-
prising once it is recognized that, unlike many goods prices that are
changed only infrequently, exchange rates are free to respond to any
new information hitting the exchange markets.
Even though exchange rates are volatile when compared with price
indexes, they are less volatile than some asset prices like stock ex-
change indexes. And exchange rate volatility is also generally lower
thanthe volatility ofcommodityprices quoted on organized exchanges.
Table 2.2 reports the volatility measures for both ofthese sets ofvari-
ables. Notice that three agricultural commodities important to farming
communities-cotton, rice, and wheat-have almost three times the
volatility of exchange rates.
That exchange rates are so much more volatile than prices should
suggest that the volatility of real exchange rates is also quite large.
Table 2.2 also provides evidence that real rates are about as volatile
as nominal rates. This table presents volatility measures of nominal
and real bilateral exchange rates as well as nominal and real effective
exchange rates. Throughout this paper, the real exchange rate (Rt) is
defined as the ratio of the domestic price index (Pt) to the domestic
currency value of the foreign price index (XtP;), where Xt is the do-
mestic currency price of the foreign currency:?
(1)
The domestic and foreign prices used are WPIs, which are available
on a monthly basis for most industrial countries. Effective exchange
rates are obtained by weighting the exchange rate~ often countries (G-
5 plus five medium-size industrial countries) by the share oftotal trade
in manufactures (imports plus exports) ofone country with each ofthe
othercountries.8 The lesson to be learnedfrom table 2.2 is animportant
one: real exchange rates are volatile primarily because nominal ex-
change rates are volatile. That is, the relative stability of price levels85 Exchange Rate Coordination
means that nominal exchange rate volatility translates into real ex-
change rate volatility.
Excessive Volatility?
Recent studies have addressed the question of whether asset prices
are excessively volatile relative to the underlying factors determining
their values. Shiller (1979), for example, studies whether long-term
interest rates are excessively volatile relative to interest rates on short-
term bonds. He finds that the volatility oflong rates exceeds the limits
imposed by term-structure models, which represent long-term rates as
averages ofexpected short-term rates. The same type ofmethodology
can be used to investigate the volatility of exchange rates.9 But the
tests are valid only ifthe researcher uses the correct underlying model
of exchange rates, and there is little consensus about the appropriate
model to use. to Huang (1981) shows thatexchange rates are excessively
volatile relative to a monetary model ofexchange rates. But exchange
rate volatility has yet to be investigated in terms of other models, so
whether exchange rates exhibit excessive volatility remains an open
question.
Changes in Volatility over Time
We have lived with flexible exchange rates for over a decade now,
but there is no evidence that exchange rate volatility has declined as
traders have become more accustomed to flexibility. Figure 2.2 illus-
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rates for the yen and dollar. (The currencies in the EMS, including the
Deutsche mark, are discussed in section 2.3.) Volatility is measured
over the twenty-four months immediately prior to each time period.
The yen and dollar experienced a decrease in volatility in 1976-77
before being hit by the second oil shock and by changes in U.S. policy
(to be discussed below). There are no obvious trends in these series.
No doubt exchange rates are much more volatile than they were
under the so-called fixed exchange rate regime ofthe 1960s. Table 2.3
uses quarterly data for real effective exchange rates to compare vol-
atility during the 1960s with that of the more recent period from 1973
to 1985. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of quarterly
percentage changes. The results are quite clear: the Bretton Woods
system's band around par values did constrain the volatility of real
exchange rates. The two currencies experiencing only a marginal in-
crease in volatility, the franc and mark, are those that have been tied
together in European exchange rate arrangements, first the SNAKE
and more recently the EMS.
Effects on Trade
To what extent should we be concerned with volatility per se? That
question is difficult to answer. There is ample evidence that the move-
ments in exchange rates reflected in the volatility measures are mostly
unanticipated. (Forexample, forward premiums explain only a fraction
of the variance of spot exchange rate changes.) So trading firms must
cope with uncertainty about exchange rates. In drawing up contracts
involving foreign exchange exposure, firms must take into account this
uncertainty. They may elect to purchase forward exchange, but the
forward market is limited to less than a dozen currencies, and for most
ofthese currencies the market is thin for all but the shortest maturities.
(Note, however, that limiting hedging alternatives to less than a dozen
currencies is less restrictive than it seems, since most of the other
currencies in the world are tied to the major currencies.) They may
use the Eurocurrency markets to hedge their currency exposure,






















Sources: Same as table 2.2.87 Exchange Rate Coordination
matching assets and liabilities in different currencies (the range ofcur-
rencies available closely corresponding to the set available in the for-
ward markets). They may take advantage of currency swaps which
expand the range offoreign currency instruments available to the av-
erage company. Firms may also take advantage of the relatively new
markets for options on foreign exchange, particularly when bidding on
contracts. Finally, large multinational firms can diversify away much
of the exchange risk. These hedging and diversification strategies are
not without costs, including the additional managerial effort required
to monitor exposure. These costs must be weighed against whatever
benefits the present system affords.
Despite strong evidence that exchange rate volatility is much greater
under flexible rates than under fixed rates, it has been difficult to es-
tablish statistically that this increase in volatility has seriously affected
international trade. Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) studied the effects
ofvolatility on bilateral trade flows ofthe United States and Germany
with other major industrial countries. They found "absolutely no sig-
nificant effect ofexchange risk on the volume oftrade" (p. 505). Cush-
man (1983) found some evidence of reduced trade using the volatility
ofreal ratherthan nominal exchange rates as his measureofrisk. Kenen
and Rodrik (1984), using multilateral trade data and effective exchange
rates for eleven countries, also found some limited evidence of trade
reduction. But for some countries in their sample, higher volatility
seemed to increase rather than reduce trade. The strongest evidence
of trade reduction effects was provided by Akhtar and Hilton (1984),
who examined aggregate export and import behavior in the United
States and Germany. Using a longer sample period than Hooper and
Kohlhagen (1978), who studied the same two countries, Akhtar and
Hilton found that German exports and imports were significantly re-
duced as a result of the increased volatility of nominal effective ex-
change rates, measured as the standard deviation of daily exchange
rates. Even that study, however, found that U.S. imports were unaf-
fected by volatility, and U.S. exports only marginally so. How is this
evidence to be interpreted? It may be that opportunities for hedging
and diversification are sufficient to limit the impact of volatility on
trade. But it also may be that our econometric methods are not suffi-
ciently powerful to determine the effects of volatility on trade.
Example ofa Trading Firm
At this point it is useful to remind readers that volatility as defined
is very different from the persistent misalignment of exchange rates
that we have experienced recently. When the rise in the dollar leads
to a loss of competitiveness for U.S. goods of more than 30 percent,
as has happened over the last several years, trade is bound to be88 R. C. Marston/G. Carli/J. Attali/J. R. Petty/R. Solomon
affected regardless of how successful firms are in reducing the effects
of exchange rate volatility.
The distinction between the two concepts can be illustrated by a sim-
ple example. Supposean Americanfirm regularly exportsgoods toGer-
many for sale in that country. Whether these goods are invoiced in dol-
lars ormarks determines whichfirm, the Americanexportingfirm orthe
German importing firm, bears the "transactionrisk," the exchange risk
associated with a particular export contract. Ifthe mark/dollar (DM/$)
rate fluctuates widely around an equilibrium value ofDM2/$ (i.e., ifthe
DM/$ rate is highly volatile), that risk can be considerable. The firm
bearing the transaction risk, however, may elect to purchase a forward
contract to hedge this risk. Alternatively, the risk can be reduced by
appropriate financing or diversification strategies. Contrast the same
American firm faced with a misalignment ofthe DM/$ rate at a level of
DM3/$ (as occurred in the early 1980s). Ifthis misalignment is persis-
tent, then the firm will find its "economic exposure" cannot be hedged
so easily. The firm may be faced with a choice between shutting down
or shifting its production facilities abroad.
2.1.2 Misalignment
Economists writing on flexible exchange rates in the 1960s contem-
plated neither the magnitude nor the persistence ofthe changes in real
exchange rates that have occurred in the last fifteen years, so the term
"misalignment" is a relatively new one. Inhis recent studyofexchange
rates, Williamson defines misalignment as the "persistent departure of
the exchange rate from its long run equilibrium level" (Williamson
1985, 13). Defining such a long-run equilibrium is no simple task. Wil-
liamson identifies the long-run equilibrium exchange rate as
thatwhich is expectedto generate a currentaccount surplus ordeficit
equal to the underlying capital flow over the cycle, given that the
country is pursuing "internal balance" as best it can and not re-
stricting trade for balance of payments reasons (p. 14).11
It is evident that such a definition refers to the real rather than the
nominal exchange rate, so the nominal exchange rate has to be adjusted
by relative prices through time if inflation differentials are significant.
This is analogous to calculating a purchasing power parity (PPP) ex-
change rate relative to some base period. But Williamson's concept of
the long-run equilibrium rate is more sophisticated than a PPP concept
since it also takes into account real shocks such as the OPEC price
increases of 1973-74 and 1978-79.
This paper will discuss some of the problems involved in defining
long-run equilibrium when we analyze target zones for exchange rates
(section 2.4). In this section, there is no need to be specific about what89 Exchange Rate Coordination
the equilibrium level of any exchange rate is in order to illustrate the
extent of movement of real exchange rates over time for some of the
major currencies. In figure 2.3, one commonly cited measure of real
exchange rates, real effective exchange rates basedon wholesale prices
in manufacturing, is used to illustrate the movements ofthe dollar, yen,
and pound sterling over the period since the start of floating rates in
1973. The figure illustrates clearly the wide swings in real exchange
rates that have characterized these currencies.12 In the period since
1973, the most serious cases of misalignment among the industrial
countries occurred with respect to the pound sterling and the dollar.
Between 1976 and 1980, the pound rose by over 40 percent in real
effective terms. Between 1980 and 1985, the dollar rose more than 35
percent using yearly averages;13 its peak in February 1985 was 42 per-
cent above its 1980 average. Both cases ofmisalignment will be studied
in detail in order to show the extent ofthe misalignment and its effects
on the economies concerned. Before doing so, however, some of the
costs associated with misalignment will be discussed to show why there
is so much concern about it.
Costs ofMisalignment
When real exchange rates are misaligned, there are incentives to
shift resources both internally and externally. Internally, whenever the
rate is overvalued, services and other so-called nontradable industries
gain at the expense of export and import-competing or tradable
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industries. Externally, foreign competitors gain at the expense ofthese
same industries. These shifts in resources are costly. 14
Misalignments of the size experienced recently, where competing
countries gain a price advantage of 20 or 30 percent, can have very
disruptive effects on firms producing traded goods. Since misalign-
ments may persist for five years or more, production facilities in some
tradable industries may be mothballed or scrapped altogether, even
though these facilities might be internationally competitive at exchange
rates closer to their long-run equilibrium levels. Short-run losses of
competitiveness due to misalignment can easily become permanent in
cases where foreign firms are able to establish themselves in an in-
dustry. Baldwin and Krugman (1986) have shown that such irreversible
changes can occur in industries where costs ofentry (e.g., investment
in marketing and distribution) would deter foreign competition in the
absence of the misalignment.
If a firm is a multinational, it might elect to shift the production
facility threatened by the misalignment to lower-cost countries. That
decision is not without peril, however, since today's undervalued ex-
change rate might swing to overvaluation as did sterling in the late
1970s. A firm electing to locate a production facility in Britain in the
mid-1970s would have been unpleasantly surprised by the real appre-
ciation that followed.
Even ifdomestic production facilities are merely mothballed, more-
over, the resulting unemployment is costly. Given sufficient time, the
labor force can be retrained and reassigned to nontradable industries.
But even if such shifts of employment between industries can be ef-
fected, the costs involved are still significant. The decision to shift to
a new industry is made more difficult by three factors. First, it is as
unclear to the labor force as it is to firms how long the misalignment
will last. The decision ofemployees to seek employment elsewhere or
of firms to close facilities must be made despite the considerable un-
certainty about the timing of any return to equilibrium. (Recall the
uncertainty about the timing of the dollar's fall.) Second, it is hard to
disentangle long-run shifts in comparative advantage from misalign-
ment. The U.S. steel and automobile industries, for example, were no
doubt hurt by the misalignment, but the growth offoreign production
was important as well. Third, there is the uncertainty about future
protectionist measures which might shield an industry from both mis-
alignment and secular declines in competitiveness. These sources of
uncertainty make it difficult for both the labor force and firms to make
decisions. In the early 1980s auto workers, for example, had to decide
whetherto retrainandpossibly relocate onthe basis oftheirassessment
of the duration of misalignment, the long-term prospects of the auto
industry, and the political economy of protectionism. This was a for-
midable task indeed-one certainly beyond the skills of economists.91 Exchange Rate Coordination
The costs ofmisalignment are not limited to the firms and laborforce
in the tradables sector. First, the economy as a whole must adjust its
consumption ofnontradables ifthe resources shifted to that sector are
to be fully employed. Since the relative price of tradables has fallen,
that shift in nontradables requires an increase in total consumption
relative to its long-run sustainable level. A capital account surplus will
finance this consumer surge, but at the cost of a buildup of debt. So
one of the costs of the misalignment, as emphasized earlier by Hause
(1966) and Johnson (1966), is a major shift in the time pattern of con-
sumption. 15 The second cost is one alluded to earlier, the cost oftariffs
and other protectionist measures which may be introduced in response
to the misalignment. In his study oftrade tensions between the United
States and Japan, Bergsten (1982) points out that the three recent pe-
riods when protectionist pressures were at their height in the United
States were times when the dollar was most overvalued relative to the
yen. The costs ofprotectionist legislation, ifenacted, which would be
"justified" by the need to protect the tradable industries, are borne by
consumers throughout the economy.
Some of the costs associated with misalignments are illustrated by
the two most serious cases ofmisalignment among the major industrial
countries, those of Britain and the United States.
The Misalignment ofSterling in 1979-82
The run-up of sterling began before the Conservative government
led by Margaret Thatcher took office in June 1979, but during the first
three years of that government the misalignment problem became se-
vere. Sterling rose from $1.70/£ in 1976 to $2.40/£ in 1980. The rise in
the nominal value ofsterling, moreover, was matched by its rise in real
terms. Figure 2.3 above shows a rise in the real effective exchange
rate for sterling by 45 percent between 1976 and 1981. Recall that this
series for the real exchange rate is based on manufacturing prices, so
the rise in the index reflects a startling loss of price competitiveness
in Britain's principal export sector. A real appreciation of this mag-
nitude led to what was called at the time the "deindustrialization of
Britain."
This appreciation is usually attributed to two main factors: the dis-
covery and exploitation of North Sea oil and the commitment to tight
monetary policy by the Thatcher government. Although North Sea
discoveries began in the early 1970s, production rose sharply only in
the late 1970s, from 16.6 million tons in (the financial year) 1976-77
to 79.6 million tons in 1979-80. 16 So the timing of sterling's rise co-
incides roughly with the rise in North Sea production (although not
with the exchange market's anticipation ofthis rise). In a detailed study
of economic policies under the first Thatcher government, however,
Buiter and Miller (1983) find that at most 10 percent of the real92 R. C. Marston/G. Carli/J. Attali/J. R. Petty/R. Solomon
appreciation can be attributed to the effects of North Sea oil. l ? The
second factor, tight monetary policy, also undoubtedly played a role
in the appreciation. The appreciation, however, may have been due
more to the announced targets for money growth rather than actual
money growth performance, since actual money growth (at least for
the broader aggregates) repeatedly outran the targets. After evaluating
these and other explanations of the appreciation, Buiter and Miller
conclude that much of the appreciation remains unexplained; indeed,
they "find the decline in competitiveness puzzling" (p. 317).
How much of this real appreciation represents misalignment of the
real exchange rate from its equilibrium level? The discovery of North
Sea oil shifted the equilibrium real exchange rate, so some of the loss
of competitiveness of British manufacturing might be better termed
""realignment" rather than "misalignment." That is, some of the real
appreciation of sterling reflected the necessary adjustment of relative
prices calledfor by this real shock. Butwhatabout the real appreciation
due to the monetary tightening (or prospective monetary tightening)?
If misalignment is defined as the departure of the exchange rate from
its equilibrium level, then the overshooting of the exchange rate as-
sociated with monetary tightening should be labeled misalignment. The
monetary policy itselfmay have been desirable as part ofa disinflation
policy, but the accompanying temporary overshooting ofthe exchange
rate imposes adjustment costs which are just as severe as when the
exchange rate becomes misaligned as a result ofexchange market inef-
ficiencies or speculative bubbles.
The effects of the appreciation on the British manufacturing sector
were unusually severe. Value added in manufacturing fell by over
8 percent in 1980 and by over6 percent in 1981, compared with declines
of 2 percent or less in GDP in these same two years. The effects on
employment in manufacturing were slower to develop, but they appear
to be longer lasting. According to figure 2.4, employment in manufac-
turing declined by over 4 percent in 1980, but by over 10 percent in
1981, and it continued to decline in 1982 and 1983. The effects of
sterling's loss of competitiveness were devastating for British manu-
facturing. The term "'Dutch Disease" is used to describe the loss of
competitiveness ofa manufacturing sector when oil or gas discoveries
drive up the exchange rate. Britain seems to have suffered from a
particularly virulent strain of this disease, although as argued above,
the causes of the illness cannot be attributed to North Sea oil alone.
Misalignment ofthe Dollar, 1981-85
The dollar has more recently been misaligned as seriously as the
pound sterling was in 1980-82, but the effects ofthe misalignment on

















goods. Figure 2.5 traces three real effective exchange rates for the
dollar, all based on prices in the manufacturing sectors of the United
States and its trading partners. The three prices represented are whole-
sale prices, value-added deflators, and normalized unit laborcosts. The
real exchange rates measure U.S. relative to foreign prices or labor
costs, so a rise in any ofthe real exchange rate series represents a real
appreciation ofthe dollar and a loss ofcompetitiveness for U.S. man-
ufactures.18 The sharp appreciation of the dollar from 1980 to 1985 is
seen in all three series, appreciations offrom 34 to 43 percent in five
years.
The origins ofthe appreciation remain a controversial subject. Among
the principal causes cited are the fiscal policies ofthe Reagan Admin-
istration, the tight monetary policies pursued by the Federal Reserve
Board since Paul Volcker became Chairman in 1979, the rise in in-
vestment associated with the Tax Reduction Act of 1981, and the flight
ofcapital to the "safe haven" ofU.S. capital markets. Branson (1985)
presents the argument in favor ofattributing much ofthe rise to Amer-
ican fiscal policies. Although the defense buildup and tax cuts were
spread out over several years, Branson argues that the Reagan Admin-
istration made credible "announcements" concerning this policy in
1981, a yearwhen the dollarrose sharply. Obstfeld (1985) also attributes
much of the rise to fiscal policy, but he emphasizes the separate con-
tribution of foreign fiscal authorities. In a back-of-the-envelope cal-
culation offiscal effects, he attributes tofiscal policy a real appreciation
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Fig. 2.5 Real exchange rates for dollar. Source: IMF, International
Financial Statistics.
to foreign fiscal policy. Frenkel (1985) argues that the initial rise in the
dollar (in 1980) was due more to actual monetary policy than to ex-
pected future fiscal policy. He cites the rise in short-term interest rates
which could not have been due to fiscal actions several years in the
future. Evidence for the role ofinvestment and the "safe haven" flight
of capital is harder to find. Branson (1985) points out that while the
level of investment rose sharply in the 1983-85 recovery, the level of
investmentrelative to GNPwas notunusually high in thatperiod. "Safe
haven" effects may have been at work during the period, but it is hard
to argue that the degree ofpolitical risk, in Europe at least, was higher
in the 1980s than in earlier postwar periods. 19
Unlike the origins ofthe misalignment, the effects on U.S. trade are
unmistakable. The export- and import-competing sectors of the U.S.
economy have been hard hit. Table 2.4 reports the trade balance by
sector in two years, 1980 and 1985, as well as the percentage change
in the trade balance over this period measured as a percentage of
exports in 1980. According to this table, the sectors hardest hit by the
misalignment were the auto and general consumer goods sectors; the
trade balance in autos deteriorated by almost 180 percent of 1980 ex-
ports during this five-year period, while the trade balance in general
consumer goods deteriorated by over 200 percent. Even the capital
goods sector, normally the strongestofthe U.S. manufacturing sectors,
deteriorated sharply with the trade balance falling to $11.6 billion from
a 1980 level of $43.4 billion. The trade balance as a whole went from
a deficit of$27.7 billion in 1980 to an alarmingly large deficit of$122.1
billion in 1985.2095 Exchange Rate Coordination
Table 2.4 u.s. Trade Account (in billions of current $)
Merchandise Trade Balance



































Source: Survey of Current Business, National Income and Product Accounts.
aMeasured as a percentage of exports in 1980 (imports in the case of fuels).
The misalignment, of course, was not the sole cause of this deteri-
oration in U.S. trade performance. During the 1980-85 period, growth
in Europe lagged behind thatin the United States, causingfastergrowth
ofimports in the United States. In addition, the debt crisis forced Latin
American countries to curtail their imports from the United States, a
factor which may be particularly important in explaining the fall in
U.S. exports of capital goods. But the trade sector hl;ld to have been
seriously affected by a change in relative prices of the magnitude
experienced.
The misalignment ledto a fall in production and employmentin many
subsectors ofmanufacturing. Branson and Love (1986) have estimated
disaggregated equations for production and employment in the United
States to determine the effects of the dollar's appreciation. They at-
tribute a loss of 1.3 million jobs in U.S. manufacturing to a 40 percent
appreciation ofthe dollar. Thisjobloss was concentratedin the durable
goods sectors, with many of these jobs being lost in two of those
sectors, primary metals and nonelectrical machinery. Nonetheless, the
effects of the dollar's appreciation on industrial production and em-
ployment were not as severe as in the case of Britain for two reasons.
First, the trade sector is much less important to the U.S. economy
than it is to the British. Perhaps more importantly, the appreciation
coincided with a defense buildup as well as a consumer boom which
kept domestic demand for U.S. goods strong despite the inroads made
by foreign goods.
These two case studies serve to illustrate the disruptive effects of
sizable misalignments. One sectorofthe economy, the tradables sector,
suffers inordinately during the period of the misalignment while the
rest of the economy stumbles on. During the period of sterling's mis-
alignment, the dichotomy between traded and nontraded sectors took
a geographical form. The northofEngland, where traditional industries
such as steel and automobiles were centered, suffered from severe96 R. C. Marston/G. Carli/J. Attali/J. R. Petty/R. Solomon
unemployment, while the area around London remained relatively
prosperous. In the United States, the contrast in fortunes between the
rust-belt and the sun-belt can be explained at least in part by the
deterioration ofU.S. competitiveness associated with the appreciation
ofthe dollar.
The problems associated with misalignment thus differ markedly
from those associated with volatility. No simple hedging strategy can
protect a firm from a loss of relative competitiveness of 30 percent or
more.
Having defined these problems ofexchange rate variability, we now
turn to the search for solutions. Some observers might contend that
the solution is obvious: governments must adopt policies designed to
minimize the variability of exchange rates. Yet the fact that there are
costs associated with volatility and misalignment does not in itself
justify policies designed to limit exchange rate variability. Before dis-
cussing the arguments for and against exchange rate policies, let us
review evidence on the effectiveness of the most common instrument
used to control exchange rates, foreign exchange intervention.
2.2 The Effectiveness of Foreign Exchange Intervention
The central question addressed in this section is the following: Does
foreign exchange intervention constitute a separate instrument of ex-
change ratepolicy, ordoes it work solely throughits effects ondomestic
and foreign money supplies? Ifthe latter is the case, then intervention
must be considered in the broader framework of monetary policy.
2.2.1 Definition of Foreign Exchange Intervention
Intervention is difficult to define because there are many ways in
which the monetary authorities can influence exchange rates. The
Working Group on Foreign Exchange Intervention, commissioned by
the Versailles Summit of June 1982, adopted a narrow definition of
intervention modified to include certain "passive" operations. Ac-
cording to the Working Group's Report (1983, hereafter referred to as
the Jurgensen Report),21 the narrow definition consists of"any sale or
purchase of foreign exchange against domestic currency which mon-
etary authorities undertake in the exchange market" (p. 4). It includes
all central bank purchases and sales of foreign exchange against do-
mestic currency, whatever form offinancing is used (reserves, swaps,
official borrowing, etc.). The Jurgensen Report adds to this narrow
definition three forms of "passive" intervention: sales concluded by
the central bank with public sector entities including the central gov-
ernment (which would otherwise have undertaken the transactions in97 Exchange Rate Coordination
the exchange market), IMP drawings, and interest payments on inter-
national reserves. This definition makes intervention equivalent to the
change in the monetary authorities' net foreign currency assets ex-
cluding any capital gains on existing assets. The definition specifically
does not include exchange market transactions carried out by other
private or public entities that might be considered to be "directed" by
the government or central bank (such as Eurodollar loans to public
authorities) because it is so difficult to establish the intent of the au-
thorities in the case of such transactions.
More important than the precise definition ofintervention is the dis-
tinction between sterilized and nonsterilized intervention. The Jurgen-
sen Report defines sterilized intervention as a "change in the monetary
authorities' netforeign currency assets which is offset by a correspond-
ing change in their net domestic assets so that their monetary liabilities
(or, specifically, the monetary base) remains unchanged" (p. 6). Non-
sterilized intervention, in contrast, involves a one-for-one change in the
authorities' net foreign currency assets and the monetary base. Non-
sterilizedintervention thus is a form ofmonetary policy, distinguishable
from conventional open-market operations only in the type ofasset being
exchangedfor money.22 There is virtually unanimous agreement among
economists that nonsterilized intervention can affect exchange rates, just
as more conventionally defined monetarypolicy canundoubtedly affect
exchange rates. Theeffectiveness ofsterilizedintervention, in contrast,
is a much more controversialtopic. Yet ifforeign exchange intervention
is to be regarded as a separate instrument ofeconomic policy, distinct
from monetarypolicy, thenitmusttaketheform ofsterilizedintervention.
2.2.2 Effectiveness of Sterilized Intervention
There are three distinct channels through which sterilized interven-
tion can affect exchange rates.23 The first is the most straightforward:
sterilizedintervention works by altering the supplies ofassets in private
portfolios, thus requiring a realignment ofasset returns. This portfolio
balance channel requires that foreign and domestic securities be im-
perfect substitutes. The more substitutable these securities are, the
smallerthe realignmentofassetreturns, andthus the smallerthechange
in the current exchange rate, required to rebalance portfolios. In the
limiting case ofperfect substitutionbetween securities, where investors
regard domestic and foreign bonds as interchangeable, sterilized in-
tervention is completely ineffective, at least through this portfolio bal-
ance channel.
The other two channels operate through announcement effects re-
quiring either market inefficiencies or superior information on the part
of the authorities. If the market is inefficient, intervention operations
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even though the operation itself provides no new information. It is
difficult to provide a convincing rationale for why market operators
would neglect publicly available information, or why intervention would
refocus their attention on this information. But we cannot rule out this
possibility a priori. Alternatively, the intervention operation could pro-
vide new information by signaling the private market about the future
monetary policies ofthe authorities.24 This last channel could operate
even ifthe market were efficient, in the sense that market participants
incorporate all available information in forming their expectations, since
the authorities naturally have superior information about their future
intentions.
There is extensive empirical research on the effectiveness of steri-
lized intervention. Although this evidence is far from conclusive, it is
strong enough to have led the JurgensenReport to conclude that "there
was broad agreement among the members of the Working Group that
sterilized intervention alone did not appear to have constituted an ef-
fective instrument in the face of persistent market pressures" (p. 20).
Whether or not sterilized intervention might have a short-term impact
through announcement effects was less clear to the Working Group.
The Jurgensen Report's conclusion is based on two different types
of evidence. First, there are tests of "speculative efficiency," which
are actually joint tests of uncovered interest parity and market effi-
ciency. Second, there are estimates of portfolio models designed to
determine the influence of bond supplies on risk premia. These two
sets of evidence reach sharply different conclusions.
Speculative Efficiency Tests
Tests ofspeculativeefficiency arebasedonuncoveredinterestparity,
the equality ofexpected returns on securities denominated in different
currencies. If uncovered interest parity holds, the expected interest
return on a dollar security should equal the expectedreturn ona foreign
currency security measured in terms of dollars (the expected return
consisting ofthe foreign interest rate plus the expected capital gain or
loss on the foreign currency).25 The expected returns will be equal
whenever investors regard the two securities as perfect substitutes. If
investors are risk averse, on the other hand, then they will regard two
securities denominated in different currencies as imperfect substitutes,
and a riskpremium will separate the two expectedreturns. In thatcase,
sterilized intervention might be effective if it can change the relative
supply of dollar and nondollar securities enough to affect the risk
premium.
To determine whether uncovered interest parity holds, investigators
must examine actual, not expected, returns (since expected returns are
not observable). Uncovered interest parity does not ensure that actual99 Exchange Rate Coordination
returns are equal on securities denominated in different currencies. But
the differential between these returns should be random as long as the
forecast errors from predicting exchange rates are random, which will
be the case if the exchange market is efficient. The speculative effi-
ciency test, which testsjointly whether uncovered interest parity holds
and the exchange market is efficient, thus examines whether actual
returns on securities denominated in different currencies are equal
except for a random factor.
During the 1970s, a score of investigators ran tests of speculative
efficiency using different time periods and currencies. With few ex-
ceptions, they were unable to reject the speculative efficiency hypoth-
esis. The evidence was strong enough for Mussa (1979) to conclude in
his summary of empirical regularities in the foreign exchange market
that "the interest differential in favor of domestic currency bonds is
equal approximately to the expected rate of depreciation of domestic
money in terms offoreign money" (p. 24).
Recent studies, however, have been able to reject the speculative
efficiency hypothesis using longer data sets and more sophisticated
statistical techniques.26 In fact, they have provided such convincing
evidence against speculative efficiency that researchers have turned
their attention toward explaining deviations from uncovered interest
parity in terms of risk premia (while maintaining the hypothesis that
the exchange marketis efficient).
Direct Evidence ofRisk Premia
If investors are risk averse, the expected returns on securities de-
nominated in different currencies will be separated by a risk premium
which is a function of the relative supplies of foreign and domestic
securities, domestic and foreign wealth, and other factors. 27 Investi-
gators have searchedfor evidenceofthis risk premium without success.
Rogoff (1984), for example, finds no evidence that the interest differ-
ential between u.s. and Canadian bonds is sensitive to the relative
supply of these bonds. (So he finds no evidence that sterilized inter-
vention in the Canadian dollar market, which would alter the relative
supplies of U.S. and Canadian dollar bonds, could affect exchange
rates.) Other investigators have used more elaborate models to inves-
tigate risk premia, and have reached conclusions similar to those of
Rogoff. 28
Interpreting the Conflicting Evidence
The two sets of evidence from speculative efficiency and portfolio
balance studies seem to give conflicting results. The studies of spec-
ulative efficiency suggest the importance of a time-varying risk pre-
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premium in terms of relative asset supplies. There are at least three
ways to reconcile this evidence. First, an appeal can be made to market
inefficiencies which would account for the ex post interest differentials
without appealing to a risk premium. But to date no one has provided
a convincing rationale for why traders would fail to eliminate any per-
ceived profit opportunities in the foreign exchange market. Second, it
may be the case that, even though a time-varying risk premium is
important in explaining interest differentials, sterilized intervention (or
any other change in relative bond supplies) has a negligible effect on
that risk premium. Third, existing empirical methods may not be so-
phisticated enough to establish the effectiveness ofsterilized interven-
tion. Unfortunately, there is no basis for choosing between these last
two alternatives. It is evident that the menu of assets available to
investors is much larger than the choice between domestic and foreign
bonds modeled in many studies. Portfolio decisions, moreover, have
an intertemporal dimension in which consumption and investment de-
cisions are made simultaneously, in contrast to the static models that
form the basis of existing empirical estimates.29 It is unclear whether
or not more sophisticated empirical models, based on a larger menu
ofassets and incorporating intertemporal decisions, would confirm or
refute existing empirical evidence. To date, however, there is no evi-
dence that sterilized intervention can affect exchange rates, at least
through conventional portfolio balance channels. On the basis of ex-
isting evidence, therefore, it is difficult to justify using sterilized inter-
vention to carry out exchange rate policy.
Ifsterilized intervention is ineffective, a second conclusion follows:
to pursue active exchange rate management, there is no substitute for
monetarypolicy. Monetarypolicy canbepursuedeitherwith traditional
domestic instruments or with nonsterilized foreign exchange interven-
tion. Whether the latter is called monetary policy or not is of little
importance.
Yet even ifmonetary policy is necessary for exchange rate manage-
ment, there is still a potential role for sterilized intervention if such
intervention provides a signal to the market about future monetary
policy. Because ofthe very nature ofannouncement effects, however,
it is difficult to find evidence of them using conventional statistical
methods. Two successive intervention operations of equal size may
provide different signals to the market, so they may have different
effects on the exchange rate.
2.2.3 Two Episodes of Foreign Exchange Intervention
Because statistical evidence leaves the question of announcement
effects unresolved, one might believe thatthe study ofspecific episodes
ofactive foreign exchange intervention might help to resolve this ques-101 Exchange Rate Coordination
tion. Such episodes are difficult to interpret, but two particularly in-
teresting episodes are singled out for study. These are the November
1, 1978, announcement of a dollar defense package by the Carter
Administration and the G-5 intervention of September 1985.
1978 Dollar Defense Package
This episode bolsters the Jurgensen Report's view that intervention
can have significant short-term effects. But the ultimate failure of the
defense package, despite the fact that U.S. authorities assembled $30
billion for foreign exchange intervention, suggests that short-term in-
tervention packages alone are not effective unless they are followed
by longer term changes in monetary policy. The dollar defense package
came at a time when the foreign exchange market was in disarray
reflecting the growing loss of confidence in the policies of the Carter
Administration. In her in-depth study of this crisis, Margaret Greene
a senior official in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, described
the market as follows: "During the last week of October, the selling
ofdollars reached near-panic proportions, and dollar rates plummeted
to record lows against several major currencies" (1984, 28). After the
President announced an anti-inflation program on October 24, a pro-
gram received with skepticism by the financial markets, the authorities
sold almost $1 billion equivalent of marks. Yet the dollar dropped
against the mark from DM1.81/$ to DM1.72/$ over the new four trading
days. Similarly, the dollar dropped against the yen from ¥ 181/$ to
¥ 178/$.
The package announced on November 1, in contrast to the anti-
inflation program, was an impressive one. First, monetary policy was
tightened, with the discount rate raised by an "unprecedented" 1per-
centage point to a (then) historic high of91 /2 percent. (Thus the package
had an important monetary policy component.) Second, a $30 billion
package offoreign currency resources was assembled for future inter-
vention consisting of $15 billion in swaps with foreign central banks,
$5 billion in drawings on the IMF and sales of SDRs, and $10 billion
in so-called Carter bonds, U.S. Treasury notes denominated in marks
and Swiss francs to be sold abroad.
The market was obviously impressed with the scope ofthe package
and the resolve about future policy which it seemed to represent. By
9:13 AM on November 1, the dollar had moved 7Y4 percent above the
previous day's low against the mark to DMl.83/$.30 Within 23 minutes,
the dollar had moved up another 1 percent against the mark while the
Desk sold the equivalent of $69 million marks, to SF1.567/$ while the
Desk sold $19 million ofSwiss francs, and to ¥ 187.5/$ with the Desk
selling $5 million. As figure 2.6 illustrates, by the time ofthe closing in
London, the dollar had risen against the mark to DM1.85/$ and against102 R. C. Marston/G. Carli/J. Attali/J. R. Petty/R. Solomon
the yen to ¥ 186.5/$. By the end ofthe (New York) day, the dollar had
risen to DM1.879/$ and to ¥187.9/$, up 7-10 percent from its lows of
the day before. The foreign exchange intervention undertaken by the
Desk that day amounted to a little more than $600 million, over two-
thirds ofit consisting ofintervention in the market for marks.
The U.S authorities, in cooperation with the Bundesbank, Swiss
National Bank, and Bank ofJapan, had to intervene repeatedly in the
following weeks as the market tried to test official resolve. Figure 2.6
shows thatthedollar stabilizedataroundDM1.90/$ and ¥ 190/$ through
the first two weeks of November, then rose somewhat more in the
following two weeks. By the end ofNovember, U.S. intervention had
totaled more than $3.5 billion. On December 1, the spot rates for the
dollar were DM1.94/$ and ¥203.5/$, both rates being significantly above
the October lows.
This episode illustrates the effectiveness of monetary and exchange
market operations in halting a currency's slide. But it also illustrates
the limitations of such action if not followed up by more fundamental
changes in monetary policy and macroeconomic policy in general. The
rise of the dollar stalled in early December as market participants
became skeptical again about the Carter Administration's policies to-
ward inflation. Then the dollar was hit by the shock ofan OPEC price
increaseof14.5 percentfollowing the political upheavals in Iran. During
the month of December, foreign exchange intervention was almost as
sizable as in November, totaling more than $3.1 billion. Yet no new
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dollar had fallen to DM1.828/$ and ¥ 194.60/$. The short-run impact
ofthe November 1 package had faded, and the time afforded to make
more fundamental adjustments in policy had been squandered. As
Greene (1984) summarized the episode: "If this time is not put to
productive use, then intervention alone, no matter how large or how
well coordinated, will not be effective" (p. 40).
G-5 Intervention in September 1985
The dollar rose through most of the four years of the first Reagan
Administration, peaking in February 1985. After falling from its Feb-
ruary highs during the following spring and summer, the dollar began
to rally in early September. That rally was cut short by the Group of
5 (G-5) meeting offinance ministers and central bank governors in New
York on Sunday, September 22. According to the G-5 statement issued
at the end of that day:
The Ministers and Governors agreed that exchange rates should play
a role in adjusting external imbalances. In order to do this, exchange
rates should betterreflect fundamental economic conditions than has
been the case. They believe that agreed policy actions must be im-
plemented and reinforced to improve the fundamentals further, and
that in view ofthe present and prospective changes in fundamentals,
some further orderly appreciation ofthe main non-dollar currencies
against the dollar is desirable. They stand ready to cooperate more
closely to encourage this when to do so would be helpful. (IMF
Survey, October 7, 1985, p. 297; Emphasis added)
The statementhadanimmediate effectonexchange rates. As the Harris
Bank Foreign Exchange Weekly Review later remarked: "Foreign ex-
change traders were taken by surprise, and the dollar dropped sharply
following the announcement, even before any official intervention oc-
curred" (February 7, 1986, p. 1). In figure 2.7, daily exchange rates for
the yen are illustrated. The dollar fell against the yen from ¥240.1/$ to
¥ 231.7/$bythecloseinLondononMonday, September23. Itfellfurther
to ¥219.5/$ by Friday ofthat week. The dollar also fell sharply against
themarkfrom DM2.844/$ onFriday, September20, toDM2.680/$ onthe
following Friday.
There is a puzzle in this dramatic movement. The exchange rates
fell despite the fact that interest differentials were virtually constant.
In the case of one-month Eurocurrency deposits, for example, the
interest differential betweendollar and yen deposits and betweendollar
and mark deposits remained roughly constant throughout the week.
Indeed, both differentials remained constant until late October when
the Japanese authorities tightened credit conditions in their market.
The fall in spot rates in the absence of interest rate movements may
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the exchange rates may have moved primarily because the G-5 an-
nouncement signaled future changes in policy rather than because of
the foreign exchange intervention that followed the announcement.
This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that, even though foreign
exchange intervention following the G-5 announcement was not much
greater than intervention in February and March of 1985, exchange
rates moved much more after the G-5 announcement.31
What did the G-5 announcement signal? The Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) Annual Report of 1986 cited two factors. First, the
joint communique gave a "convincing demonstration ofunanimity and
common policy resolve, and ... the subsequent intervention opera-
tions were fully coordinated and had the wholehearted support ofnearly
all the major industrial countries represented" (p. 149). The fact that
thepolicy actions were coordinatedwas saidtobeofcrucialimportance
both because of the potentially larger scale of any intervention oper-
ations and because there was more ofan assurance that the authorities
ofdifferent countries would not be working at cross-purposes. Second,
the G-5 statement marked a major change in U.S. policy, which had
shunned foreign exchange intervention since the beginning ofthe Rea-
gan Administration. As the BIS Annual Report describes it:
[fJrom the point of view of credibility, it was of crucial importance
that, for the first time, the US authorities, whose capacity to sell
dollars is in principle unlimited, were seen to recognize the need for
a further downward adjustment of the dollar. (p. 149)
Yet, given the evidence against sterilized intervention, one mustremain
skeptical about whether either factor, international coordination or the105 Exchange Rate Coordination
active participation of the United States, could have been decisive if
the G-5 countries had simply announced a series of sterilized inter-
vention operations. Instead, the G-5 announcement may have moved
exchange rates because the market believed eitherthatthe intervention
would be monetized or that the intervention, even though sterilized,
signaled future changes in monetary policy.
Inthe caseofthe G-5 announcement, the evidenceis unclearwhether
or not foreign exchange intervention was monetized. As indicated above,
short-term interest differentials between the dollar and the mark or yen
remained constant from September 22 through most of October. The
first unambiguous sign ofchanges in monetary policy occurred in Japan
in the last week of October. The dollar had begun to rally somewhat,
so the Japanese authorities decided to tighten monetary conditions,
sending short-term interest rates from 6.5 percent to 8 percent in only
a few days. As a result, the yen resumed its upward rise.
Comparison ofThese Two Episodes
A comparison of these two episodes is quite instructive. The 1978
defense package bucked a downward trend ofthe dollar. Ifit had been
the signal for a fundamental change in U.S. monetary policy toward a
more restrictive stance, then the short-term gains in strengthening the
dollar in November and December 1978 might have been consolidated
and extended into 1979 and beyond. But since no such fundamental
change was forthcoming, the dollar resumed its downward trend. The
G-5 intervention, in contrast, was clearly reinforcing rather than buck-
ing a trend. In fact, it is useful to ask whether the G-5 announcement
and the actions that followed were on balance successful in driving the
dollar down relative to its previous trend.
Figure 2.8 tries to answer that question by putting the period im-
mediately following this announcement into a longer term perspective.
This figure shows the weekly movement ofthe yen from January through
December 1985, highlighting the G-5 announcement. The trend ofthe
dollar against the yen is downward throughout, but in the period im-
mediately following the announcement the dollar's fall accelerates. The
same cannot be said ofthe dollar's fall relative to the mark. It is true
that the G-5 announcement halts a temporary rise in the dollar, but it
merely restores that mark to its previous trend. These figures lend
support to Martin Feldstein's (1986) view that "forGermany and other
GS countries, the Plaza (New York) meeting was essentially a non-
event" (p. 6). Vet, even ifFeldstein is right about currencies otherthan
the yen, the G-5 period may provideevidencefor announcementeffects
in the case ofthe yen. Under one interpretation, the dollar fell relative
to the yenbecausethe marketperceiveda greaterdegree ofcooperation
between Japan and the United States than in the previous four years,
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pursue a tighter monetary policy to drive the yen down, a policy not
actually put into effect until late October.
This section has established the limits offoreign exchange interven-
tion as a distinct exchange rate policy. Ifintervention is monetized, it
can have powerful effects on exchange rates, but so also can conven-
tional monetary policy. If intervention is sterilized, in contrast, then
its effects on the exchange rate are thought to be minimal. The an-
nouncement of the intervention may be the occasion for a rally in the
exchange market, but perhaps only if the market believes that the
intervention signals broader changes in monetary policy.
Because the evidence implies that sterilized intervention is ineffec-
tive, the remainderofthis paperassumes that monetary policy, broadly
defined to encompass nonsterilized intervention, is the prime instru-
ment ofexchange rate policy.
Exchange rate policy could take a variety of forms. First, govern-
ments could reestablish a system offixedexchange rates, perhaps with
wider bands to accommodate greatervariability ofexchange rates. The
fixed rates could be confined to regional groupings of countries, as in
the European Monetary System, orthey could encompass all industrial
countries. Second, governments could retain the present system of
flexible exchange rates, but institute stricter rules governing exchange
rate management. Third, governments could establish a system of tar-
get zones for exchange rates with "soft margins" that leave govern-
ments with some discretion concerning intervention. All three alter-
natives, which involve systemic changes in the international monetary107 Exchange Rate Coordination
system, contrast sharply with ad hoc agreements like the G-5 inter-
vention, which are designed to cope with specific exchange rate prob-
lems. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 will explore these alternatives.
2.3 Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again: Restoring Fixed
Exchange Rates
This section analyzes the case for returning to fixed exchange rates.
The first part considers the general rationale for fixing exchange rates.
The next two parts ask what lessons can be learned from two fixed
exchange rate systems, the Bretton Woods system, which lasted until
1971, and the European Monetary System established in 1979.
2.3.1 Rationale for Fixed Exchange Rates
Although many rationales have been offered in support of fixing
exchange rates, two are particularly prominent in most discussions.
First, fixed exchange rates help to neutralize financial disturbances that
might otherwise have an impact on the real side ofthe economy. Sec-
ond, fixed rates provide discipline to governments that might otherwise
follow inflationary policies. Each argument is considered in turn.
Sources ofDisturbances
Economists analyzing exchange rate regimes have often posed the
following question: Would fixed orflexible exchange rates be preferable
in the presence ofa particular disturbance? Fixed exchange rates can
be shown to be superior when financial disturbances are predominant
in an economy. A fall in the demand for money, for example, can be
neutralized by a reduction in its supply leaving the exchange rate un-
affected. If investors shift from domestic money to foreign securities,
this can be neutralized by intervention in the foreign exchange market.
In either case, the policy designed to keep the exchange rate fixed also
helps to keep the disturbances confined to the financial sector, so that
output and employment are left undisturbed. Ifdisturbances originate
in the real sector of the economy, however, it is difficult to make a
case for preventing exchange rate movements since these movements
generally facilitate the adjustment of relative prices that real disturb-
ances require.32 A rise in demand for exports, for example, leads to
an appreciation ofthe domestic currency under flexible rates since the
increase in demand raises domestic interest rates and attracts capital
from abroad. The appreciation of the domestic currency, by shifting
demand to foreign goods, helps to dampen the rise in domestic de-
mand.33 Thus fixed exchange rates (or target zones for exchange rates
to be discussed below) are better designed for periods when financial
disturbances are predominant.108 R. C. Marston/G. Carli/J. Attali/J. R. Petty/R. Solomon
Most economists analyzing the desirability of foreign exchange in-
tervention have implicitly assumed that exchange rate fluctuations can
be traced directly to a particular disturbance or group ofdisturbances.
Thecaseforforeign exchangeinterventionis much strongerifexchange
rate fluctuations instead reflect excessive volatility due to market inef-
ficiencies. If exchange rates are excessively volatile (as discussed in
section 2.1), then fixed rates, or at least policies designed to limit
exchange rate fluctuations, may be called for even in economies where
disturbances are predominantly real in origin. Similarly, if exchange
rates are driven by speculative "bubbles," self-fulfilling expectations
that depart from market fundamentals, then exchange market inter-
vention may be called for.
In the present context ofthe misaligned dollar, this characterization
ofreal and financial disturbances takes a more specific form. As men-
tioned above, many economists trace the appreciation of the dollar
during the first four years of the Reagan Administration to the expan-
sionary fiscal policy of that administration. This fiscal expansion rep-
resents a "real" disturbance because the defense buildup has shifted
expenditure toward U.S. domestic goods (both traded and nontraded).
Branson (1986) points out that the appreciation ofthe dollar has mod-
erated the effects ofthe fiscal expansion on domestic output and prices
by switching domestic and foreign private consumption toward foreign
goods. If that appreciation had been prevented through the monetary
expansion required to keep exchange rates fixed, then the real appre-
ciation of the dollar required for adjustment in the real sector would
have been brought about by a rise in the U.S. price level rather than
by a nominal appreciation of the dollar. Branson suggests that higher
u.S. prices would nothave beenpreferable to the nominal appreciation
and consequent fall in the inflation rate that did occur.
If, instead ofbeing caused by the fiscal expansion, the dollar's recent
rise had been due to a speculative bubble or to a more conventional
type offinancial disturbance, then the case for fixing the exchange rate
would have been stronger.34 In the presence offinancial disturbances,
intervention to limit or halt the appreciation of the dollar would have
helped to insulate the real sector from the disturbance. Presumably
this intervention would have had to have been nonsterilized, in which
case the intervention would have involved a significant change in mon-
etary conditions. The question that has to be asked is whether gov-
ernments are willing to tie their monetary policy to an exchange rate
target in such circumstances.
Discipline
Proponents offixed exchange rates often base their case on a second
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inflationary policies soon run up against a balance of payments con-
straint. Itis true thata governmentfollowing inflationary policies under
flexible exchange rates must contend with the depreciation of its cur-
rency, but that same government under fixed exchange rates is likely
to have to contend with a highly visible balance ofpayments crisis. If
the crisis results in a devaluation ofthe domestic currency, that change
in currency value is likely to be much more politically damaging than
a gradual change in currency value brought about "by the market."
This discipline argument for fixed exchange rates might appear to be
a persuasive one, especially after more than a decade ofhigh inflation
when governments were free to pursue "independent" monetary pol-
icies under flexible rates.
In practice, however, the discipline provided by fixed rates is less
than complete for the following reasons:
1. Fixed exchange rates exert no discipline over expansionary fiscal
policies, at least as long as capital flows are highly sensitive to interest
differentials. Higher government spending financed by either taxes or
bond issues induces an inflow of capital and a balance of payments
surplus rather than deficit.35
2. The fixed rate system as a whole has no external constraintunless
currencies are tied to an external standard. IfN-l currencies are tied
to a reserve currency, as currencies were tied to the dollar under the
Bretton Woods system, then there is discipline for the system as a
whole only to the extent that the reserve currency country manages
to discipline itself.36 Under Bretton Woods, the United States main-
tained a relatively stable price level throughout the 1950s and early
1960s, but during the Vietnam War the Johnson and Nixon Adminis-
trations followed what were widely regarded as inflationary policies.
3. If, instead, all currencies are tied to a commodity like gold, then
the increases of the world money supply are dependent on chance
discoveries of gold and can be affected by political instability in the
producingcountries. Ifthegold supply does notincrease rapidly enough
to keep pace with real activity, then either the world price level must
fall (accompanied, most likely, by a fall in real activity) or banking
systems must develop alternative means of payment (as happened in
the last half of the nineteenth century). In times of crisis, moreover,
governments are unlikely to adhere to the external standard, since the
stability of their banking systems is likely to be regarded as more
important than the credibility oftheir external standard. During several
banking panics of the nineteenth century, even the Bank of England,
the stalwart defender of the gold standard system, suspended gold
payments in an attempt to stabilize its banking system.
4. Whether or not the U.S. dollar (as the Nth currency) is tied to
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Once a parvalue is changed, future commitments to a fixed rate system
are less credible than before, so countries must weigh the benefits of
a change in parity against the loss of credibility. A general lesson to
be learned from past exchange rate systems is that governments will
abandon fixed pegs, evenifonly temporarily, ifexchange rate flexibility
will help to ease the adjustment of their economies to a major shock.
This was as true ofBritain in the nineteenth century, despite its pivotal
role under the gold standard, as it was of France and later Britain in
the interwar period, and a host of countries in the Bretton Woods
period. If governments are likely to abandon pegs in a crisis, then it
is necessary to ask, what is the value ofthe discipline afforded by fixed
rates? The answer must be that the value of the discipline is highly
dependent on how participants in the financial markets assess the com-
mitmentofthegovernmentto the parvalue andthe likelihoodofshocks
large enough to alter that commitment. So the discipline argument is
less decisive than it appears to be.
2.3.2 Weaknesses of the Bretton Woods System
The Bretton Woods system was the fixed rate system that tied most
currencies together during the postwar period until 1971. After fifteen
years offlexible exchange rates, many observers look back longingly
at this period. As already noted, the macroeconomic performance un-
der Bretton Woods compares favorably with that of the more recent
period. Against this must be weighed some ofthe inherent weaknesses
of the Bretton Woods system which observers of the time considered
major drawbacks of this fixed rate system.
Lack ofMonetary Independence
The Bretton Woods system was often criticized for providing no
discipline for the reserve currency country (for the reasons discussed
above). The United States, in effect, was too free to pursue an inde-
pendent monetary policy to the detriment of the system as a whole.
But an equally serious weakness of Bretton Woods was the lack of
monetary independence afforded to othercountries ofthe system. Bret-
ton Woods imposed such an extreme form ofdiscipline on these coun-
tries that independent monetary policies to deal with disturbances were
severely handicapped.
If one country tried to increase its money supply by increasing do-
mestic credit in the banking system, this led to an incipient decline in
interest rates and an outflow of capital which offset, at least partially,
theinitial increase in the money supply.37 This offsettingeffectofcapital
flows is characteristic of any fixed exchange rate system with inter-
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Capital Controls
Ifcapital flows offset domestic monetary expansions orcontractions,
one solution is to restrict such flows with controls of one form or
another. That solution was adopted widely under Bretton Woods. The
recent period of exchange rate flexibility, by no coincidence, has wit-
nessed the progressive dismantling ofcontrols, beginning with controls
in Germany and the United States in 1974, Britain in 1978, and Japan
in several stages beginning in 1980. Of the major industrial countries
during this period, Italy has maintained and France has enhanced their
controls, but that is because they have had to defend exchange rate
parities within the European Monetary System.38
The overall effectiveness of capital controls in stemming reserve
flows is in some doubt since banks and other institutions go to some
lengths to find ways to evade controls. But there is no doubt that
controls distort investment and borrowing incentives, as two episodes
from the Bretton Woods period will illustrate.
1. The Kennedy and Johnson Administrations constructed progres-
sively more complex barricades in an attempt to stem outflows of
capital from the United States during the 1960s. In 1963, the Kennedy
Administration began with an interest equalization tax on securities
issued by foreigners in the U.S. market. The Johnson Administration
followed with its voluntary credit-restraint program in 1965, which
limited the liquid foreign assets that U.S. banks and nonbank financial
institutions could hold, and a direct investment program in that same
year, which compelled U.S. corporations to finance overseas opera-
tions withfunds raisedoutsidethe United States. U.S. banks responded
by expanding their operations in London and other foreign centers, in
part to serve the U.S. corporations driven abroad for financing. With
the arbitrage link between the United States and foreign financial cen-
ters severed, large interest differentials developed that reflected the
distortionary effects of the controls. At one point in 1969, the three-
month Eurodollar deposit rate rose to 11.5 percent at a time when U.S.
Treasury bill rates were at 7.7 percent and U.S. certificate of deposit
rates (because ofthe Federal Reserve's Regulation Q) remained fixed
at 6 percent. Such remarkably large differentials distorted financing
decisions by U.S. and foreign·corporations. The controls also had the
unintended effect ofgiving infant industry protection to the Eurodollar
and Eurobond markets in London.
2. Similar interest differentials developed between Germany and the
Eurocurrency markets in response to a network of controls that the
German authorities built beginning in 1971. The controls were pro-
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to nearly all claims by nonresidents to residents, until they were re-
moved in early 1974. Figure 2.9 compares the internal German interest
rate (on interbank loans) with the Euromark deposit rate (which is
always approximately equal to the covered Eurodollar rate). The figure
illustrates very clearly the effects of the controls, designed to limit
inflows rather than outflows of funds, which led to a higher interest
rate in Germany than in the market for mark deposits in London. At
one point in early 1973, the differential between the internal and ex-
ternal markets reached the remarkably high level of 11 percent. That
is, an interbank loan in Germany carried an interest rate 11 percent
higher than a mark-denominatedloan, perhaps made by the same bank,
in the Eurocurrency markets. With differentials that large, there is no
doubtthat considerable managerial effortwas expended in finding ways
to evade such controls.
The U.S. and German controls were not isolated examples. In fact,
controls were the norm during the Bretton Woods period. As discussed
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Exchange Rate Crises
In the 1960s there was a tendency to blame private agents in the
financial markets for the "speculation" that brought on balance of
payments crises. Thus, for example, British Labor Government min-
isters characterized speculators who took positions against the pound
as the "Gnomes of Zurich." More recently, however, international
economists have formulated "balance ofpayments crisis" models whose
central actors are these same Gnomes, now transformed into rational
investors who speculate against governments. These governments, in
turn, blindly follow domestic credit expansions that are unsustainable.
The Gnomes help to accelerate the date ofthe crisis, a crisis that is in
any event inevitable, but otherwise act like responsible citizens.
There is no doubt some truth in both views of balance of payments
crises. As politicians ofthe 1960s knew only too well, increased capital
mobility makes it more difficult for governments to sustain parities that
are under attack by speculators. But, on the other hand, the decision
to change parities is often dominated by political considerations be-
cause governments have committed themselves to defending parities.
When parity adjustments justified by economic factors are postponed
on political grounds, speculators attempt to force the government's
hand. The government may respond by instituting restrictive macro-
economic policies simply to defend a parity value, policies it might be
able to avoid under a flexible rate system. Or it may attempt to shield
its reserves from attack by restricting capital movements. Whether the
government successfully defends the parity or not, the country loses.
If the parity holds, the economy is disrupted by the crisis and by the
policies that have been adopted to defend the parity. Ifthe parity col-
lapses, speculators win capital gains at the expense ofthe central bank.
We illustrate several of these features of exchange rate crises by de-
scribing the sterling crisis of the mid-1960s.
The Sterling Crisis
This crisis began building when Harold Wilson's Labor Government
came to power in October 1964.39 The Wilson Government chose not
to devalue at that time despite a strong economic case that devaluation
would help restore British competitiveness. One prominent reason given
for the decision was the government's fear that it would be identified
as the "devaluation party," the Labor Party having devalued the last
time it was in power (in 1949). (This is a good example ofthe discipline
provided by a fixed rate system, although in this case the discipline
postponed needed adjustments.)
Having made the decision not to devalue, the Wilson Government
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attaining office when it had to arrange a $3 billion international credit
from foreign central banks. (This was at a time when British bank
reserves totaled only $2.6 billion and the monetary base was $9.1 bil-
lion.) The government managed to surmount each crisis, in part by
arranging foreign central bank financing but also by instituting restric-
tive macroecoriomic policies, until the fall of1967 when the speculative
pressure became overwhelming. On the final day before devaluation-
Friday, November 17-British foreign exchange reserves fell by $1
billion, in a country where capital controls were as tight as anywhere
in Western Europe (Solomon 1977, 95). The next day sterling was
devalued by 14.3 percent. Not only did the government have to suc-
cumb to the pressures of foreign exchange speculation, but in doing
so it lost over £350 million as a result of intervention in the forward
markets.40
In his assessment of the sterling crisis, Robert Solomon, a former
senior adviser at the Federal Reserve Board, points out two lessons:
It exhibited the potential for, and the impact of, speculative flows in
the accounts ofa major trading country.... It pointed up the weak-
ness of an exchange rate system in which a change of parity of a
major currency became a political issue of the highest order that
engaged heads of state; in such a system a change in the exchange
rate could be excessively delayed, permitting the buildup ofa large
imbalance which, whenaction was finally takento correctit, required
massive shifts of resources. (Solomon 1977, 99)
These same two lessons were consistent themes in the exchange rate
crises of the Bretton Woods system until its demise in 1971.
These weaknesses of Bretton Woods turned opinion sharply against
fixed exchange rates, especially after the failure of the Smithsonian
Accord ofDecember 1971 (to be discussed below). It was only after a
near decade of floating that sentiment turned against flexible rates, at
least in Western Europe where the European Monetary System was
established in 1979.
2.3.3 The European Monetary System
The European Monetary System (EMS) was established on March
13, 1979, to tie together the currencies of member countries in a joint
float against the dollar and other foreign currencies. The initial mem-
bership of the EMS consisted of all European Community members
except the United Kingdom, which elected to float freely.41 All mem-
bers except Italy agreed to limit fluctuations oftheir currencies to 2Y4
percentaround a grid ofcentral rates; Italy adopted a 6 percent margin.
As stated by the European Council in its Resolution ofDecember 1978,
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Europe." The following evaluation ofthe EMS's success in achieving
this objective is based primarily on an excellent statistical analysis by
Rogoff (1985).42
Reducing the Variability ofExchange Rates
There is evidence that the variability ofbilateral exchange rates has
been significantly reduced in the EMS. Rogoff (1985) measures ex-
change rate variability by the variances of unanticipated changes in
exchange rates.43 For both nominal and real bilateral rates, the vari-
ances have fallen for exchange rates between the mark and the other
two major currencies, the French franc and lira. In the case of the
nominal franc/DM rate, the variance of monthly prediction errors has
fallen by two-thirds, while in the case ofthe nominalliraiDM rate, the
reduction has been by almost four-fifths. The results for real exchange
rates are less dramatic, but still statistically significant. This is for a
period when bilateral rates between the mark and dollar or yen were
becoming more, not less, volatile.
Countries in the EMS, however, should be concerned about the
variability of effective exchange rates as well as EMS bilateral rates.
There is some reason to believe that the stability ofintra-EMS bilateral
rates is purchased at the price ofgreater variability in exchange rates
between EMS currencies and those of other countries, so the EMS
may not have stabilized effective exchange rates.44 Rogoff shows that
among the three major EMS currencies, only the lira has experienced
a reduction in volatility for its nominal effective exchange rate. A
similar pattern emerges for the real effective exchange rate, with the
lira being the only currency among the three to experience a significant
reduction in volatility. It should be pointed out that countries outside
the EMS, including the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan,
experienced statistically significant increases in the volatility of real
effective rates, so the EMS may have helped to prevent the volatility
of EMS currencies from rising even further.
Role ofCapital Controls
Another set of evidence, also due to Rogoff (1985), provides an
interesting perspective on how the EMS works. Rogoff examined real
interest differentials within the EMS. Ifmostdisturbances are financial
in nature, then foreign exchange intervention that stabilizes exchange
rates should also stabilize interest rates. Yet, as Rogoff shows, the
variability ofreal interest rate differentials has increased in the EMS,
at least between the three largest countries.45 There are two possible
interpretations of this result, neither of them favorable to the EMS.
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is the case, then foreign exchange intervention within the EMS is un-
desirable (see the discussion of intervention policy in section 2.2). Or
capital controls may have been a major factor contributing to the sta-
bility ofEMS exchange rates. Ifthe EMS is held together by extensive
capital controls, it provides much less ofa model for a world exchange
rate system.
Giavazzi and Giovannini (1986) present an interesting analysis ofthe
role ofFrench and Italian capital controls within the EMS. Figure 2.10
reproduces their graphs ofinterest differentials between the (free) Eu-
rocurrency markets and national markets in French franc and lira in-
struments. Large differentials between the free and regulated markets
emerge attimes ofexchange rate crises. (In normal times, trade credits,
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eliminate any differentials.) These interest differentials that emerge in
times ofcrises showhowbindingthe controlsareoninvestmentflows. 46
Nonetheless, the controls appear to be essential if the authorities are
to defend weak currencies of the EMS from speculative attack. As
Giavazzi and Giovannini conclude:
In the present system weak currency countries have to choose be-
tween the welfare losses associated with capital controls and the
losses arising from the volatility ofshort-term interest rates, and, as
the evidence shows, overwhelmingly optfor the former. Thus capital
controls appear to be an important feature ofthe EMS, which allows
weak currency countries to take part in the exchange rate arrange-
ment, without suffering from excessive domestic interest rate fluc-
tuations. (p. 473)
Thus we have in the EMS an exchange rate system that has managed
to stabilize bilateralexchange rates within Europe, butonlyby severely
limiting capital flows between the countries ofthe EMS. Perhaps that
is the only way to maintain fixed exchange rates in today's environment.
Other Features ofthe EMS
One reason that capital controls are so essential to the EMS is that
the system has failed to bring about the convergence ofinflation rates
among its members, a key objective ofthe EMS.47 Rogoff (1985) com-
pares five-year-average inflation rates before and after the establish-
ment of the EMS. He reaches the surprising conclusion that any con-
vergence ofinflation rates that did take place was between the inflation
rates of Germany and two outside countries, Japan and the United
Kingdom.
Because inflation rates have been so divergent, frequent parity changes
have been necessary among EMS currencies. There have been eleven
realignments sincetheinceptionoftheEMS. Thefranc/DM parityalone
has been changed six times, the latest realignment being in January
1987, for a cumulative depreciation of the franc relative to the mark
ofover27 percent. Similarly, thelira/DM parityhas beenchangedseven
times for a cumulative depreciation of the lira ofover 38 percent.
Some of the realignments have been quite large. The latest realign-
ment on January 12, 1987, involved a revaluation of the mark and
guilder by only 3 percent and the Belgian franc by 2 percent. But the
April 1986 realignment lowered the franc relative to the mark by 6
percent, while in July 1985 the lira was devalued 7.8 percent against
all other EMS currencies and in April 1986 fell 3 percent more relative
to the mark and guilder when those currencies revalued by 3 percent.
The frequency and magnitude of these realignments suggest how dif-
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2.4 Managed Floating
The alternative to fixed exchange rates would seem to be flexible
exchange rates, but there are many shades of gray in between these
two extremes. Present exchange rate arrangements are usually referred
to as a system ofmanaged flexibility. There are very few rules to this
system, if indeed the term "system" is appropriate to a laissez-faire
world. In its 1978 amendments to its Articles of Agreement, the IMF
did specify certain guidelines for exchange rate intervention. This sec-
tion begins by examining these guidelines then turns to several more
specific rules for managed floating that have been proposed. Very dif-
ferent from these rules are the taxes on exchange market transactions,
which will be considered next. Finally, "target zones" for exchange
rates are analyzed in some detail because they have received so much
attention recently.
2.4.1 Alternative Approaches to Managing Exchange Rates
In the 1978 amendments to its Articles ofAgreement, the IMF spec-
ified three principles that should govern exchange rate policies:
Principle A: A member shall avoid manipulating exchange rates or
the international monetary system in order to prevent effective
balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive
advantage.over other members.
Principle B: A member should intervene in the exchange market if
necessary to counter disruptive conditions which may be char-
acterized inter alia by disruptive short-term movements in the
exchange value ofits currency.
Principle C: Members should take into account in their intervention
policies the interests of other members, including those of the
countries in whose currencies they intervene. (IMF Survey, May
2, 1977, 131-2)
It is not easy for a group of governments with different agendas to
achieve agreement on a set ofpolicy rules. So it may not be surprising
that the principles adopted in this agreement are not specific enough
to be binding on any government. Unless there are objective criteria
for determining whether or not a country is "manipulating" its ex-
change rate to gain unfair competitive advantages, for example, Prin-
ciple A may not prevent such behavior. Even the definition of "dis-
ruptive short-termmovements" mayproveelusiveonceitis recognized
thatexchange rates naturally exhibithigh volatility. To ensurethatthese
principles are carried out, some have proposed more specific rules of
exchange rate management.119 Exchange Rate Coordination
Minimal Reform: The "Reference Rate" Proposal
One of the most interesting proposals was that made by Wilfred
Ethier and Arthur Bloomfield (1975) in the Princeton Essay series.
These economists, writing soon afterthe breakdownofBretton Woods,
recognized that a return to fixed exchange rates, whether desirable or
not, was simply not feasible. So instead of specifying rules that man-
dated central-bank intervention, as had beendone in the BrettonWoods
system, they proposed rules that prohibited certain types of central
bank actions. But unlike the IMF principles later adopted, they offered
objective criteria for evaluating central bank adherence to rules. The
"reference rate" proposal formulated by Ethier and Bloomfield (1975,
10) had two rules:
1. No central bank shall sell its own currency at a price below its
reference rate by more than a fixed percentage (possibly zero) or buy
its own currency at a price exceeding its reference rate by more than
a fixed percentage. This is the sole restriction imposed upon central-
bank intervention.
2. The structure of reference rates shall be revised at periodic pre-
specified intervals through some defined international procedure.
The aim ofthe first rule was to prohibit a central bank from driving its
currency away from its reference level (thereby "manipulating" its
exchange rate, in the language ofthe IMF's Principle A). Forexample,
a central bank could not drive its currency down to gain competitive
advantage for its export industry. At the same time, the proposal did
not oblige the central bank to intervene at all. (It is in this sense a
"minimal reform" proposal.) Nor did the proposal prevent the central
bank from "leaning against the wind" to limit movements away from
the reference rate.
The authors recognized that their proposal was limited in aim, but
it did provide a means to limit the type of competitive depreciations
that had plagued countries during the 1930s. In order for this proposal
to be successfully implemented, however, countries would have to
agree on the reference rates themselves "through some defined inter-
national procedure" (their second rule). The discussion oftarget zones
below identifies some of the formidable problems involved in defining
equilibrium exchange rates. It also points out how difficult it would be
for different national governments to agree on equilibrium rates. Both
of these problems carryover to any agreement on reference rates.
Rules for Leaning against the Wind
Because volatility itself is viewed as a major problem by some gov-
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Such policies are designed to limit the "disruptive short-term move-
ments" addressed by the IMF's Principle B. This form ofintervention
requires minimal knowledge of what factors may be moving the ex-
change rate and does not require that the authorities have superior
knowledge about the long-run equilibrium exchange rate. It does pre-
suppose that exchange rates are too volatile in general, and that inter-
vention operations can be effective in reducing this volatility.
There is a danger, however, that central banks might lean against the
wind more in one direction than the other, thus imparting a bias to
exchange rate movements overtime. To ensure against "manipulating"
exchange rates in this way, central banks could be required to balance
out their net purchases and sales of foreign exchange over a given
period. Argy (1982, 27) cites one rule that "[n]et reserve changes in a
given direction should not persist for more than a few consecutive
months (except when reserve levels are excessive or deficient)." Argy,
however, goes on to argue that such rules would be difficult to imple-
ment and might even provoke one-way speculation.
Ifgovernments wish to limit exchange rate volatility, there is a non-
market alternative to foreign exchange intervention. This involves im-
posing a tax on exchange market transactions.
Tobin's Exchange Market Tax
This tax, proposed by James Tobin (1982), is imposed on each ex-
change market transaction at a uniform rate, perhaps 1 percent. The
tax has the explicit aim of "throw[ing] some sand in the wheels ofour
excessively efficient international money market" (Tobin, 1982, 489).
According to Tobin, a tax ofthis magnitude is unlikely to make much
difference to merchandise trade transactions, since the tax represents
such a small proportion of the value of the product and the profit on
the transaction. But such a tax is likely to be a much more significant
factor in a round-trip financial transaction, thus discouraging "hot money
flows." It would make overnight or one-month round-trip investments
in foreign currencies almost prohibitively expensive. Even in the case
of a three-month investment, a 1 percent tax paid twice in the round-
trip transaction could be overcome only by an 8 percent differential
between interest rates in the two currencies involved.
Fora tax ofthis nature to be successful, it mustbeuniformly imposed
throughout the world, otherwise financial transactions will gravitate to
tax-free zones. The experience ofU.S. controls in the 1960s illustrates
that point. If such a tax were somehow internationally coordinated,
however, itis likely to have a significantimpactonthe volumeofforeign
exchange transactions, especially those associated with short-term in-
vestments. For that reason, the tax may reduce the volatility of ex-
change rates. But such a tax is unlikely to have a significant effect on
the misalignment of exchange rates because longer term investments121 Exchange Rate Coordination
and trade transactions would remain largely unaffected. William Poole
has drawn an analogy betweenTobin's taxand real estatetransfertax.48
The lattermay reduce the volatility ofreal estate prices but surely does
not affect the longer run level ofprices. Nor would it prevent a spec-
ulative bubble from developing.
Like the exchange market tax, the reform proposals governing in-
tervention outlined above offer no solution to the misalignment prob-
lem. They provide "rules ofthe game" for managed floating, but they
provide little positive guidance for exchange rate policy. The first rule
of the reference rate proposal does prohibit central banks from delib-
erately creating a misalignment through exchange market intervention,
but none of the major misalignments experienced recently have been
caused by central bank intervention. None of the rules prohibit other
macroeconomic policies that can lead to misalignment. Nor do they
require that centralbanks take positiveactiontopreventmisalignments
from developing.
2.4.2 Targets Zones for Exchange Rates
In the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, the national
authorities were committed to intervening in the foreign exchange mar-
ket whenever the exchange rate reached a 1 percent "band" on either
side of its par value vis-a-vis the dollar. A "target zone" system of
exchange rates also has bands for the exchange rate, but these bands
are typically muchfarther apart, thus allowing considerable fluctuation
in the exchange rate. More importantly, in a target zone system the
authorities make no firm commitment to defend those margins. One of
the leading advocates oftarget zones, John Williamson, has described
the zone as "a range beyond which the authorities are unhappy to see
the rate move, despite not being prepared to precommit themselves to
prevent such movements" (Williamson 1985, 64).
Williamson's Proposal for Target Zones
Given Williamson's central role in the debate over target zones, it
is useful to spell out his proposal more fuUy.49 His target zones would
involve five elements:
1. Soft margins, rather than a commitment to prevent the rate from
straying outside the target zone;
2. A zone perhaps 20 percent wide (i.e., with 10 percent margins),
outside of which rates would be considered "clearly wrong";
3. A crawling zone, with the crawl reflecting both differential infla-
tion and any need for balance of payments adjustment;
4. Publication of the target zone; and
5. The partial direction of monetary policy, including foreign ex-
change intervention, to discourage the exchange rate from straying
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The target zone system thus would be a form of managed float with
the targets well defined but with national authorities only tentatively
committed to intervention or other policy actions.
Anatomy ofTarget Zones
Target zones share some of the characteristics of fixed exchange
rates, but there are important differences that may be the source of
both strengths and weaknesses for this proposed system. Some ofthe
system's crucial characteristics are:
1. Wide bands. With margins permitting fluctuations of 20 percent,
this system is not designed to limit the volatility of exchange rates.
Thus hedging by corporations will be as important as in a flexible
regime. But if the targets are adhered to and the margins hold, then
the system can be regarded as a way of avoiding misalignments.
The wide margins permit those abrupt shifts in speculative sentiment
that appear to characterize flexible regimes. Nonetheless, exchange
rate crises cannot be ruled out, at least when exchange rates approach
the margins.
2. Analogy with national monetary targets. Zones are more akin to
national monetary targets than exchange rate parities underthe Bretton
Woods system. Like monetary growth targets, target zones for ex-
change rates single out one economic variable for special attention
without firmly precommitting the national authorities to achieving a
specific target for that variable.
Yet there are importantdifferences between monetarygrowth targets
and target zones for exchange rates. First, unlike the money growth
targets, the target zones provide no continuous guide for policy since
the targets are binding only when the exchange rate reaches one ofits
margins. It is true that in some countries monetary growth targets are
set in terms ofbands, but these bands are usually much narrower than
thoseproposedfor exchange rate targets. Second, the variable targeted,
the exchange rate, is an endogenous variable normally determined by
many factors other than economic policy. It is true that the money
supply is also an endogenous variable affected by both bank and non-
bank behavior, but the authorities have more direct control over the
money supply than the exchange rate.
3.'Anchorfor system? One ofthe advantages ofa fixed rate system
is the anchor such a system provides for inflationary expectations.
Target zones provide no such anchor since the zones are explicitly
adjustedfor differences in inflation rates. The zones may help to anchor
expectations regarding real exchange rates, but only if governments
are perceived as being willing to defend the margins.
4. Commitment to defend margins. Despite the wide margins around
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tween defending the targets or changing them. Economists advising a
government faced with a speculative attack are likely to advocate de-
fending the targets only ifthey view exchange rate movements as part
of the problem. (Recall the discussion of economic disturbances in
section 2.3 where exchange rate movements sometimes facilitate, rather
than hinder, the adjustment ofthe economy.) Given a permanent shift
in the demand for a country's exports, for example, the government
would be well advised to change the exchange rate target rather than
defend it. But if the change is temporary, then defense of the target
might be warranted.
5. The political economy of target zones. The rationale for target
zones is verydifferentifgovernments are viewedas the principal source
of economic disturbances. Target zones then might have a political
rather than an economic role to play in stabilization. Proponents of
target zones argue that announced exchange rate targets might con-
strain governments in their macroeconomic policies, much like multi-
lateral tariff agreements constrain national trade policies.
In the specific context ofthe dollar's misalignment, it is argued that
target zones might have encouraged the Reagan Administration to fol-
Iowa less expansionary fiscal policy. This may be a difficult argument
to sustain, however, since in orderto pursueits fiscal policy, the Admin-
istration overcame much stronger domestic constraints than any in-
ternational agreement could have imposed.
A better case for the political role of target zones can be made in
the European context. A frequent argument in favor ofthe EMS is that
it constrains member countries to pursue policies closely in line with
its largest member, West Germany. The Mitterrand Government in
France, for example, stayed within the EMS despite being severely
constrained at times by the requirements of membership. One major
exception to this European pattern is the United Kingdom, which has
rejected joining the EMS exchange rate arrangements in favor of the
free floating of the pound sterling.
Perhaps the best that can be said for this political justification for
target zones is that it may be relevant to governments predisposed to
the constraints or strongly committed to regional orglobal cooperation.
For governments aiming to pursue policies significantly different from
those of other industrial countries, target zones may be swiftly dis-
carded if they become a major impediment to such policies.
6. Objective criteria for modifying targets. The problem of con-
straining government behavior would be less serious ifthe target zone
proposal did not provide for the modification of targets. Here there is
a direct conflict between the politics and economics of international
agreements. In order to constrain governments to keep commitments,
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at the time ofan agreement. Butthe economic arguments for modifying
targets in the face of real disturbances may be very compelling.
To complicate the problem, there is seldom a consensus among ex-
perts about the need for changes in real exchange rates. Instead, they
may disagree about the nature and scope of a disturbance as well as
about its effects on the real exchange rate. Without objective indicators
dictating when targets should be changed, the changes made will be
based at least partly on political considerations.
Consider the recent misalignment ofthe dollar. Although the appre-
ciation lasted over four years, there is no clear-cut consensus about
its causes. The appropriate policies to follow ifthe misalignment is due
to the fiscal policies of the Reagan Administration are very different
from those to follow if the dollar's appreciation is due to bubbles or
to capital flows seeking a "safe haven" or to an investment boom
triggered by tax changes.5o Similarly, although sterling's appreciation
lasted over four years, economists still dispute whether North Sea oil,
tight monetary policies, orotherfactors caused the appreciation. When
there is so much dispute about the causes of a misalignment, there is
unlikely to be a consensus about modification oftargets.
Defining Exchange Rate Targets
Ifeconomic conditions are favorable, governments might be willing
to precommit themselves to a system of target zones. But formidable
problems await the negotiators of such an agreement. Chief among
these problems is that of finding (and agreeing upon) appropriate tar-
gets. Itis useful tofollow Williamson's (1985) description ofhowtargets
might be defined.
1. The first step in defining a target rate or target zone for the real
exchange rate is to decide the appropriate equilibrium current account
balance ofeach country (or equivalently, the "underlying capital flow"
in Williamson's terminology, since the capital account must be the
mirror image ofthe current account). The equilibrium current account
of a developing country like Brazil or Thailand is very different from
that of an industrial country like Germany or France. In estimates of
his "fundamental equilibrium exchange rate," Williamson makes ex-
plicit allowances for such differences among countries. This is not to
say that judgments about equilibrium current accounts are easy to
make, as the experience of the Smithsonian meeting discussed below
makes clear. Not least of the problems is that the negotiating govern-
ments will understand the close connection between the current ac-
count "equilibrium" agreed upon and the prospects for their leading
export industries.
2. Once figures for equilibrium current accounts are agreed upon,
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a trade model with its associated trade elasticities. To do so, it is first
necessary to adjust the current account for cyclical factors, then to
calculate the discrepancy between the equilibrium current account and
the cyclically adjusted current account for a particular year. The trade
model is then used to calculate the change in real exchange rates nec-
essary to equilibrate the current account.51 Since estimates of price
elasticities range widely, this step in the calculation is fraught with
difficulties. Cutting the elasticities in half, for example, requires twice
as large a change in real exchange rates to achieve equilibrium.
3. The calculations so far only determine the equilibrium real ex-
change rate in a single year. It is then necessary to adjust that rate for
real disturbances that occur through time. Among such real disturb-
ances are the oil price shocks experienced twice during the 1970s,
natural resource discoveries (such as North Seaoil for Britain), secular
movements in demand, and secular movements in supply, including
differential productivity growth rates. One issue that arises is whether
to take into account changes in government policy ifsuch changes are
notjusttemporary measures butlastfor a numberofyears. In his study
ofexchange rates, Williamson explicitly excludes the shift in U.S. fiscal
policy under the Reagan Administration because it is not sustainable
in the long run. He also excludes variations in demand or supply over
the business cycle from whatever source.
Most ofthese adjustments require that arbitraryjudgments be made.
Recall how difficult it was for analysts to evaluate the effects of the
first OPEC price increase in 1973. Even the effects of productivity
growth are difficult to assess. To illustrate some of the difficulties in-
volved in determining equilibrium rates, the next section examines the
Smithsonian agreement on exchange rates, an agreement reached by
the major industrial countries in December 1971.
Multilateral Agreement on Exchange Rates: the Smithsonian Accord
The Smithsonian agreement provides one of the few examples of a
multilateral exchange rate agreement, but the lessons to be learned
from this agreement are none too encouraging about exchange rate
agreements in general.
First, the agreement was reachedonly afterprolongedand sometimes
acrimonious negotiations stretching through the fall of 1971. One of
the reasons why the negotiations were so difficult was that the objec-
tives of the participants were inconsistent with one another, which is
not surprising given the pivotal role played by exchange rates in each
economy. The Nixon Administration wanted to achieve a turnabout of
$13 billion in its currentaccount through the realignment ofcurrencies.
The other major countries of the OECD envisaged, when their indi-
vidual estimates were summed, a reduction of their current balances126 R. C. Marston/G. Carli/J. Attali/J. R. Petty/R. Solomon
of only $3 billion (Solomon 1977, 199). That an agreement was at all
possible in these circumstances is probably attributable to the heavy-
handedactions ofthe NixonAdministration. InAugust 1971 thatadmin-
istration imposed an import surcharge of 10 percent in lieu ofan agree-
ment to realign the major currencies.
Second, the agreement set new exchange rates that were simply
unsustainable in the long run, despite President Nixon's characteriza-
tion ofthe accord as the "most significant monetary agreement in the
history of the world" (New York Times, December 19, 1971, p. 1). It
is interesting to compare the rates agreed upon at the Smithsonian
meeting with those prevailing a little over a year later after the agree-
ment had broken down and most rates were allowed to float. Table 2.5
presents the central rates agreed upon at the Smithsonian meeting as
well as the market exchange rates prevailing in the second quarter of
1973. The market rates diverge from the Smithsonian central rates by
more than 10 percent in three out of four instances, with the dollar
weaker after the advent offloating than before (except in the case of
the pound). The table also presents a comparison between the market
rates in the second quarter of 1973 and the central rates adjusted for
changes in prices in orderto seeifthe divergence was causedbyrelative
inflation rates during the interim period. (Wholesale prices in manu-
facturing are used to adjust the central rates.) In the case of the yen
and pound, the market rates deviate more from the adjusted central
rates than from the original central rates; for the other two currencies,
the deviations are smaller, but are still about 10 percent off the mark.
Thus an agreement rea~hed only after prolonged negotiations resulted
in an exchange rate realignment that did not go far enough in lowering
the value ofthe dollar.
The obstacles to agreement and to successful implementation oftar-
get zones are formidable. As James Tobin, writing in 1978, expressed
Table 2.5 Comparison of Smithsonian and 1973 2nd Quarter Spot Rates
Smithsonian Parities % Deviations
Actual Adjusteda 1973 II from from
Actual Actual Adjusted
¥$ 308.00 309.72 264.98 -14.0 -14.4
$/£ 2.6057 2.6886 2.5300 -2.9 -5.9
DM/$ 3.2225 3.1119 2.736 -15.1 -12.1
FF/$ 5.1157 4.8842 4.4288 -13.4 -9.3
Sources: Parities: Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report, 12 June 1972;
Exchange rates: IMF, International Financial Statistics,. WPI for manufacturing: un-
published IMF data.
aSmithsonian parities adjusted for changes in WPI for manufacturing from December
1971 to 1973 II.127 Exchange Rate Coordination
it: "it is scarcely conceivable that the various OECD countries could
individually project, much less agree on, much less convince skeptical
markets of, a system of equilibrium or target exchange rates for 1980
or 1985" (Tobin 1982, 493).52
Some advocates of target zones acknowledge the economic argu-
ments against such a system but nonetheless contend that targets have
a role to play in fostering international economic cooperation. They
argue that an agreement on target zones at least commits governments
to regular consultations on exchange market developments. Even such
regular consultations, however, may not induce governments to limit
the divergences in macroeconomic policies that cause many misalign-
ments. And if they do not, then this argument for targets loses much
of its force.
2.5 Concluding Comments
This paper began by describing two distinct types of exchange rate
variability-volatility and misalignment. Each type of variability im-
poses its own costs on an economy, and each presents a different
challenge to exchange rate policy.
The volatility of exchange rates could be sharply curtailed if the
industrialcountries agreed toreinstitute a fixed rate systemwith narrow
bands. The EEC has succeeded in fixing bilateral rates within Europe,
although fixed rates within the EMS have beenmaintained only through
frequent parity adjustments and through the imposition of extensive
capital controls.
In contemplating such a move, however, countries should recall the
lessons of Bretton Woods. Fixed rates cannot be maintained without
extensive capital controls. This paper has analyzed the distortions to
investment and borrowing incentives that are entailed by such mea-
sures. Balance ofpayments crises, moreover, will inevitably break out
unless frequent parity changes are permitted. But ifparity changes are
permitted, one ofthe chiefbenefits offixed rates, the credibility given
to inflation targets, will be lost. Fixed rates, finally, will inhibit the
adjustment to real shocks like the oil price increases experienced in
the 1970s.
Short of fixing exchange rates, countries could pursue more active
foreign exchange intervention policies. There might be a role for in-
ternational agreements to ensure that intervention is confined to "lean-
ing against the wind" operations or to prevent intervention from al-
lowing countries to "manipulate" exchange rates to gain competitive
advantages. The analysis offoreign exchangeinterventionpolicy above
suggests that the intervention would have to be nonsterilized, so active
intervention would require a compromise of monetary targets.128 R. C. Marston/G. Carli/J. Attali/J. R. Petty/R. Solomon
If misalignment is the most important problem, then the search for
an ideal exchange rate policy may be too narrowly focused to be ef-
fective. A major source ofmisalignment in the last ten years has been
the macroeconomic policies pursuedbycountries like the United States
and Britain. It is not at all clear that the solution to major policy
imbalances among the industrial countries lies in limiting exchange rate
movements rather than changing the policies themselves.
The adoption oftarget zones for exchange rates, on the other hand,
may playauseful role in inducinggovernments to modify theirpolicies.
At the very least, the breaching of target zones may call attention to
the need for international consultations on macroeconomic policies.
Whether target zones would be any more successful than the IMF
agreements remains to be proven.
The Jurgensen Report concluded that exchange rate policy must
consistofmore than(sterilized) interventionto be successful. Countries
must be willing to commit their macroeconomic policies to controlling
exchange rates. In many circumstances, governments may find that
limiting exchange rate variability is not worth this price.
Notes
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1. The passages are from Paris (1938, 166) and Harrod (1951, 582-84).
2. Productivity tends to rise in recovery periods, so the recent rise in pro-
ductivity in these two countries may be partly a cyclical phenomenon.
3. Later sections discuss how measures of misalignment take into account
real economic shocks (which usually require departures ofexchange rates from
relative price trends).
4. A useful survey of this literature is Frenkel and Mussa (1984).
5. Kenen and Rodrik (1984) show that other measures of volatility give
roughly similar results.
6. Similar results are obtained for earlier periods by Frenkel and Mussa
(1980) and Bergstrand (1983).
7. If R t measures the real exchange rate of the dollar relative to the pound
sterling, for example, then a rise in R t reflects either a rise in U.S. relative to
British prices (i.e., Pt/P; rises) or a fall in the dollar price of the pound (Xt
falls, reflecting a depreciation ofthe pound). In either case, a rise in R t reflects
a loss of competitiveness for U.S. exports.
8. Notice how much less variable the effective exchange rates, which rep-
resent a diversified basket ofcurrencies, are compared with the bilateral rates
(whether nominal or real).
9. Just because most movements in an exchange rate are unforecastable does
not imply that the exchange rate is excessively volatile, although companies129 Exchange Rate Coordination
engaged in international trade may regard the volatility as too high. Instead,
the volatility ofan exchange rate is "excessive" ifit exceeds that ofthefactors
which determine it.
10. Meese and Rogoff (1983) examine the out-of-sample performance of
several well-known models of the exchange rate and conclude that a random
walk model performs as well as any of these models.
11. Williamson's conceptofthe "underlyingcapital flow" is linked to current
account targets (as discussed below in the subsection on "Defining Exchange
Rate Targets" in section 2.4.2).
12. It is interesting to note that while the yen was more volatile than the
dollar during the period 1973-85, the misalignments of the dollar were larger
than those of the yen. This underscores the need to carefully distinguish be-
tween the two concepts.
13. Note that a rise in the real exchange rate represents a real appreciation
of that currency.
14. Forfurtherdiscussionofadjustmentcostsassociatedwith misalignments,
see Branson (1981), Richardson (1984), and Williamson (1985).
15. As pointed out by Williamson (1985), it is interesting that Johnson (1966)
saw misalignments arising from misguided intervention policy underfixed rates
(maintaining unrealistic parities) rather than from market forces under flexible
rates. Like most economists at that time, Johnson did not foresee the large
misalignments that were to occur under flexible rates.
16. See Atkinson, Brooks, and Hall (1985). Note that the second round of
OPEC price increases in 1978-79raised the value ofthe NorthSeadiscoveries.
17. Ifthe real appreciationwas equalto45 percent, then 10 percentrepresents
2/9 of the entire loss of competitiveness. Forsyth and Kay (1980) attribute a
larger proportion of the appreciation to North Sea oil.
18. These series are obtained from the IMF's International Financial Sta-
tistics. Because productivity growth is generally greater in the manufacturing
sector than elsewhere in an advanced economy, real exchange rates based on
general price indexes (which contain nontraded as well astradedgoods) provide
a less reliable index ofrelative competitiveness than real exchange rates based
on manufacturing prices alone. Forfurther discussion, see Marston (1986). For
a discussion ofthe relative merits ofvalue-added deflators and unit labor costs
as measures of international competitiveness, see Artus (1978).
19. There is no evidence, for example, that interest rates charged on Eu-
rodollar loans to Europeans rose relative to loans to American residents.
20. These figures, taken from the national income accounts, are smaller than
the balance ofpayments figures widely quoted in the press, but they are more
relevant for determining the effects of the misalignment on output and
employment.
21. Philippe Jurgensen was Chairman of the Working Group. The countries
representedin thisgroup werethe so-calledGroupof7(0-7)countries: Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States.
22. Sterilized intervention effectively consists ofswapping foreign bonds for
domestic bonds, although the operation has several steps to it. Recall that
central banks typically hold foreign exchange reserves in the form ofinterest-
bearing, foreign-currency-denominated securities. When a central bank wants
to intervene in the exchange market, it first sells the foreign securities, then
uses theforeign currency soobtainedto buydomesticcurrencyfrom the private
sector. If the intervention is to be sterilized, the sale of foreign currency is
followed byan expansionary open-marketoperation (oran analogous monetary130 R. C. Marston/G. Carli/J. Attali/J. R. Petty/R. Solomon
operation indifferent institutional environments) involving the purchase of
domestic bonds with the recently acquired domestic currency, thus restoring
the monetary base to its initial level. Forfurther discussion ofsuch operations,
see Girton and Henderson (1976) and Marston (1985).
23. This description of the three channels draws on Loopesko (1984).
24. Mussa (1981) emphasizes the importance ofannouncement effects in his
study offoreign exchange intervention for the Group of30. See also the recent
analysis of announcement effects by Kenen (1986).
25. If ir, i; are the domestic and foreign interest rates, respectively, and S7 is
the expected change in the spot exchange rate (the capital gain on the foreign
currency), then uncovered interest parity implies that
it = i; + sr.
26. Hansen and Hodrick (1980), for example, adopt a generalized least-
squares estimating procedure so that they can utilize overlappingobservations,
thus making it possible to use weekly data rather than the monthly or quarterly
data typically employed in the past. Cumby and Obstfeld (1984) also use weekly
databut adopttechniques to take into accountthe nonstationarity ofthe foreign
exchange data. These studies and others that have followed are able to reject
decisively the joint hypothesis of market efficiency and uncovered interest
parity. Levich (1985) provides a comprehensive survey of recent studies.
27. Two recent surveys of the theoretical literature on risk premiums are
Adler and Dumas (1983) and Branson and Henderson (1985).
28. See, for example, Obstfeld (1983), Frankel and Engel (1984), and Danker
et al. (1985).
29. Studies ofinternational asset pricing based on intertemporal utility func-
tions include Stulz (1981) and Hansen and Hodrick (1983).
30. The following account relies heavily on Greene (1984).
31. For a similar view, see Veda (1986). Intervention in the autumn of 1985
totaled $13 billion compared with $10 billion in February and March of 1985
(Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report, 1986, p. 149).
32. For a general analysis of foreign exchange intervention in the presence
of different types of disturbances, see Henderson (1984).
33. A similar analysis applies to any aggregate demand disturbance. The
effects of aggregate supply disturbances on the exchange rate, however, are
ambiguous since an increase in aggregate supply lowers prices at the same time
that output expands (so nominal output, and hence the demand for transaction
balances, may rise or fall).
34. Among those investigating speculative bubbles as the source ofthe dol-
lar's appreciation are Krugman (1985) and Frankel and Proot (1986).
35. If a government pursues an expansionary fiscal policy indefinitely, then
eventually foreign investors will balk at further exposure to political risk. But
until that point is reached, a country is free to expand through fiscal means.
36. Ifthe reserve currency countryfollows an expansionarymonetary policy,
the resulting balance of payment deficits are automatically financed, since the
country gaining reserves invests them in the securities ofthe reserve currency
country. The monetary base of the reserve currency country, moreover, does
not decline as a result of the deficit as long as other countries choose to hold
their foreign exchange reserves in the form of securities rather than the mon-
etary base of the reserve currency country. McKinnon (1974) has proposed
that all foreign currency reserves be held in the form ofcentral bank balances
(bearing a market interest rate). If this were the case, foreign exchange inter-
vention would affect the monetary bases of both reserve and nonreserve cur-
rency countries alike.131 Exchange Rate Coordination
37. Ifdomestic and foreign securities are perfect substitutes, the attempt by
one country to increase its money supply through domestic credit expansion
succeeds only to the extent that this one country manages to increase the
money supplyoftheentiresystem. (The systemwouldbelike a setofreservoirs
connected by open channels; an attempt to increase the water level in one
would succeed only to the extent that the water levels of all were increased.)
Formal models of the offset phenomenon are presented in Kouri and Porter
(1974) and Herring and Marston (1977).
38. In 1986 both Italy and France relaxed some oftheir controls, but many
transactions by residents remain restricted.
39. For an excellent account ofthis period, see chapter 5 ofSolomon (1977).
40. Bank of England, Quarterly Bulletin, December 1969, table 18.
41. The members were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The United Kingdom formally joined the
EMS, but chose not to participate in the exchange rate mechanism. For a
detailed discussion ofthe system, see Ungerer et al. (1983).
42. One of the successes of the EMS, which will not be discussed since it
lies outside the scope of this paper, is the development ofthe European Cur-
rency Unit (or ECU) as a parallel currency. For an interesting discussion, see
Padoa-Schioppa (1985).
43. He uses the forward rate as the predicted exchange rate in the case of
nominal rates, and he uses forecasts ofreal exchange rates based on a random
walk model ora vectorautoregression (VAR) in the caseofreal exchange rates.
44. Canzoneri (1982) and Marston(1984) analyzethis possibilityin theoretical
models of exchange rate unions.
45. The one exception is the real interest rate differential between Germany
and Italy formed by using a VAR forecast.
46. The controls also lead to asymmetric responses of EMS currencies to
outside disturbances, since among the three most important EMS currencies
only the mark has open capital markets. When there is speculative pressure
involving the dollar, for example, the mark takes the brunt of this pressure,
thus causing strains within the EMS. See Marston (1984).
47. As Jacques van Ypersele, one ofthe architects ofthe EMS, has described
it: "The objective was indeed that external stability be the result less of ar-
tificially imposed constraints than ofa convergence ofeconomic trends among
member countries, in particular of prices and costs" (Ypersele 1985, 15).
48. See Brainard and Perry (1986,234). Another tax that has been proposed
by Liviatan (1980) is the "real interest rate equalization tax." This tax, by
creating a wedge between domestic and foreign interest rates, tries to reduce
the incentive for outflows (or inflows) of capital when a country abruptly
changes its monetary policy. A country trying to stabilize its price level through
monetary contraction, for example, would ordinarily have to contend with an
appreciation caused by an inflow of capital. By creating a wedge between
domestic and foreign returns, however, a country might be able to dampen the
currency appreciation. Such a tax is probably best thought ofas a supplement
to national monetary policies, to be used when one country's policies depart
sharply from those ofother countries.
49. Earlier advocates oftargets for exchange rates include the''OpticaGroup"
of economists from EEC countries, see Commission of the European Com-
munities (1975).
50. Branson (1986) underscores the confusion regarding the source of the
dollar's rise by suggesting that misalignment is a "topic . . . for the National
Science Foundation, not a new Bretton Woods" (p. 176).132 R. C. Marston/G. Carli/J. Attali/J. R. Petty/R. Solomon
51. For further discussion of this approach to estimating equilibrium ex-
change rates and the problems associated with it, see Artus (1978).
52. There is reason to believe that agreements on equilibrium rates would
be even more difficult to achieve in the 1980s than in 1971. Experts differ
widely in their estimates of equilibrium rates today, in large part because of
the many structural changes which have occurred since the Smithsonian agree-
ment. Consider the key bilateral rate between the yen and dollar. Before the
dollar recently plunged from ¥250/$ to ¥ 160/$, estimates of the equilibrium
value ofthis bilateral rate were as wide ranging as the market rates themselves.
Williamson (1985), for example, cites six studies with estimates ranging from
¥ 131/$ to ¥209/$. Krause (1986) writes of a possible ¥ 100/$ rate. Changes
in energy prices make all such calculations difficult. But another major reason
why the yen/dollarrate is difficult to assess is the patternofproductivitygrowth
in the United States and Japan which distorts simple purchasing power parity
calculations. For further discussion, see Marston (1986).
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2. Guido Carli
International Financial Policies
International Cooperation in a Fixed Exchange Rate System
My experience in the areaofforeign exchanges goes back more than
forty years. In 1945 the Italian Exchange Office was restructured and
I became a member ofthe Board ofDirectors and the Executive Com-
mittee. In 1947 Italy became a member of the International Monetary
Fund and I was elected Executive Director.
The Italian Exchange Office was reshaped to establish close links
between the Bank ofItaly and the Italian Exchange Office. During the
1930s the links had been severed and the exchange office was given
full autonomy in managing the external positions related to trade and
payments. In the framework of a policy aiming at autarchy, interna-
tional trade and payments were regulated through export/import quo-
tas, bilateral payment agreements, and multiple exchange practices.
The arrangements adopted immediately after the end of the war
reflected the conviction ofthe Governor ofthe Bank ofItaly, who later
became the President of the Republic, that balance of payment sur-
pluses and deficits have to be reversed by equivalent expansions or
contractions of the currency circulation.
Between 1958 and 1968 the international monetary system designed
at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 went into full operation; it137 Exchange Rate Coordination
could be described as a gold exchange standard in the process of be-
coming a dollar standard; theinternationalcooperationaimedatmaking
the transition as gradual as possible. The establishment of external
convertibility for the European currencies at the end of 1958 was ex-
panded to other currencies, including the Japanese yen, and was fol-
lowed by the elimination ofexchange restrictions on current payments
and to some extent on capital transfers; adjustments of parities were
limited to "fundamental" disequilibrium in the balance of payments,
in accordance with the objectivesofthe systemcreatedby thedelegates
to the conference.
The extent to which members ofIMFcooperated to make the system
work can be attributed to concomitant circumstances; I mention the
hegemony of the United States and its acceptance by the rest of the
countries of the Western world.
Japan, Germany, and Italy in particularwere interestedin integrating
their respective economies in the international market; the economies
ofthese countries were more orless to the same degree export-led and
from the expansion ofworld trade received a major impulse to develop
internally. In addition, political considerations played a role. The Ger-
mans considered the presence of American troops on German soil to
defend the independence of their country a priority; the Italians saw
the strengthening ofthe international cooperation as the most powerful
barrier against the instauration ofa collectivist economy advocated by
the Communist Party.
The functioning of the Bretton Woods system depended on an ade-
quate volume of international liquidity and on its composition being
commensurate with the preferences of the major trading partners.
Because the United States resolutely opposed a change ofthe mon-
etary price of gold, the balance of payments of the United States, on
a liquidity basis, became the only source of additions to international
liquidity. In order to reconcile the U.S. opposition to increasing the
price of gold and the mounting resistance by some countries to ac-
cepting dollars as the main component ofinternational liquidity, it was
decided to begin studies within the IMF in order to develop an artifi-
cially created reserve asset to be adapted to the liquidity needs of
expanding trade and to be made independent from the gyrations ofthe
American balance of payments. It was a timid attempt to limit the
American hegemony.
In February 1962 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York was au-
thorized to buy or sell foreign currencies in spot and forward markets
and to negotiate a network ofswap facilities with the central banks of
other countries. The swaps provided a specific amount offoreign cur-
rency in exchange for an equivalent dollar credit for foreign central
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par value of the other parties' currencies. The Bundesbank and the
Bank of Italy had accumulated large amounts offoreign exchange re-
serve because of balance of payment surpluses, had refrained from
converting them into gold, and had collaborated very extensively.
Other collaborative efforts to defend the international monetary sys-
tem, in spite ofits weakness, became more and more evident with the
institution in 1961 of the so-called gold pool. The central banks of
France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and
the United States along with the Bank of England intervened in the
London market to hold the market price of gold at or close to the
official price. In March 1968, it was decided to suspend the arrange-
ments of the gold pool; during the period of its operation, the partic-
ipants sold a net total of $2.5 billion ofgold on the London market of
which $1.6 billion was provided by the United States.
The decision to suspend the arrangements ofthe gold pool was taken
in a meeting held in March 1968 at the headquarters of the Federal
Reserve Board in Washington. I took an active part in the debate; it
was recognized that:
(a) Given the fixed price ofgold, on one side, and the rising national
price levels, on the other side, gold had become an undervalued
asset in short supply. To sell gold to the markets could bring
about the complete depletion of gold reserves and their substi-
tution with dollar assets. The transition to the dollar standard
could become the unavoidable consequence and could have the
effect offurther deteriorating confidence in the dollar.
b) Public opinion outside the United States could not understand
the sacrifice of the gold reserves in order to finance the dollar
overhang created by an uninterrupted period of balance of pay-
ment deficits on a liquidity basis by the United States. Not only
France, but most European countries had become more reluctant
to keep an ancillary position vis-a-vis the United States.
After 1968 it became evident that the system offixed exchange rates
based de facto on a reserve asset inundating the market at the rhythm
of $7.7 billion a year could not survive. Efforts were made by the
central banks of Japan, Germany, and Italy to defend the system by
resisting temptations to get out of dollars. The United Kingdom was
in need of dollars to face the strong pressures on the sterling. When
in August 1971 the gold convertibility ofthe dollar was suspended, the
world was not taken by surprise; it was the end of an era.
Market Interventions in a Floating Exchange Rate System
"The Bretton Woods system might have been able to survive an end
of gold convertibility. It could not survive inflationary policies of the
center country that characterized the decade frGill the mid-sixties on,"139 Exchange Rate Coordination
the report to the Congress of the Commission on the Role of Gold in
Domestic and International Monetary Systems concluded. I fully agree
with this statement.
The emergence of the floating rate, which left exchange rates to
market forces, did not end concern about exchange rate policies. At
the annual meeting of the IMF in September 1973 in Nairobi, Mr.
Witteveen spoke of the need for governments to accept responsibility
for exchange rates within a context ofinternationally agreed rules. He
clearly had in mind that some degree of management offloating rates
was needed.
At the annual meeting ofthe IMF in September 1974 in Washington,
D.C., Mr. Simon stated, "Marketforces mustnotbe treated as enemies
to be resisted at all costs, but as the necessary and helpful reflections
of changing conditions in a highly interrelated world economy with
wide freedom for international trade and capital flows."
The conflict between these two schools of thought opened in the
second halfof1971 when exchange rates ofindustrial countries floated.
Karl Schiller characterized some floating rates as "cleaner" than oth-
ers. The terms "clean" and "dirty" have been commonly used by
economists and occasionallybypublic officials to distinguish a situation
in which a floating rate is left wholly to market forces from that in
which the rate is influenced by buying and selling operations by central
banks, by imposition ofrestrictions, surcharges, or advanced require-
ment deposits as a way to restrain purchases offoreign exchanges.
After more than fourteen years ofgeneralized floating, the problem
of establishing some degree of international cooperation in managing
the floating rates remains unresolved.
Market intervention as an instrument of economic policy was re-
habilitated at the Versailles meeting ofthe G-7 in May 1982. Although
the final communique reiterated the articles of the IMF, according to
which interventions to counter disorderly market conditions have to
be limited, the G-7 agreed to conduct a study on exchange market
intervention. On the basis of an impressive amount of econometric
texts, the report of that study did not confirm the position that inter-
vention would be ineffective and counterproductive, as maintained by
the U.S. Treasury representatives in the study group.
In January 1985 finance ministers and central bank governors ofthe
G-5 reaffirmed their commitment to undertake coordinated interven-
tions. Notwithstanding official sales of $10 billion, there was little evi-
dence ofa broad coordinated intervention effort and markets remained
unconvincedofofficial determinationto curbthe extraordinary strength
of the dollar.
In September 1985 finance ministers and central bank governors of
the G-5 met again, on the initiative ofthe United States, in New York140 R. C. Marston/G. Carli/J. Attali/J. R. Petty/R. Solomon
to reassess theirpolicies. The demonstrative show ofofficial unanimity
took the market by surprise. The day after this meeting the dollar
registered its sharpestfall. Total concerteddollar sales were $13 billion;
crucial to this success was the direct participation ofthe United States
selling $3 billion.
The dollar exchange rate has since declined uninterruptedly; the
balance of trade of the United States has shown little improvement,
and the reactions in the United States have not been univocal.
The Chairman ofthe Board ofthe Federal Reserve System repeated
that he did not consider it to be a sensible policy to declare "you drive
the dollar down forever until you see an improvement in trade."
Uncertainties about the future of the dollar exchange rate could
dampen the willingness of foreign investors to maintain funds in the
United States. The Federal Reserve could be forced to raise interest
rates.
The Chairman of the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers admitted
that exchange rate stability is desirable, but he was not prepared to
accept target zones; "The markets know best" appears to be his un-
shakeable faith.
President Reagan and the Secretary ofthe Treasury confirmed their
determination of not allowing that dollar exchange rates to "cripple"
American farmers and exporters again; they considered it harmful to
speculate on what the appropriate level ofthe dollar should be; the fall
of the dollar exchange rate was regarded as an alternative to protec-
tionism; they strongly opposed protectionism.
The American Congress has increasingly received requests by the
various pressure groups more adversely affected by the loss of com-
petitiveness to take action to protect their interests. To argue about
the length oftime needed in order for the fall ofthe dollar's exchange
rate to manifest its effects does not convince those who better under-
stand the effectiveness of custom duties applied case by case.
The Adjustment Process in a Floating Exchange Rate System
The Chairman of the Board of the Federal Reserve System has de-
scribed the present position ofthe United States and the possible cor-
rections in the following terms:
... We are drawing on the savings ofothers-in 1986, the net influx
offoreign capital appears to have exceeded all the savings generated
by individuals in the United States. That capital influx is the mirror
image of the deficit in our current account-we cannot, at one and
the same time, borrow abroad (net) to cover domestic investment-
savings imbalances and run a balanced current account.
. . . we are living beyond our means-individuals,businesses, and
government have collectively been spending more than we produce.141 Exchange Rate Coordination
That might be acceptable ifwe were matching the foreign borrowing
with a surge in productive investment in the United States. That has
been the case at all times in the distant past in the United States.
. . . But we are not making that match now-it is consumption that
has been leading the economic parade.
. . . to close our 150 billion dollar trade deficit by increasing the
manufactures (and I do not see another practical avenue) implies a
15/20 percent increase in industrial output over the coming years
above and beyond that required to support domestic growth. While
a surge of that kind would be welcome in many respects, the chal-
lenge is to achieve it without renewing inflationary pressures in that
sector.
[What is needed is] to increase our own savings or reduce others'
demands on savings at home. The obvious candidate is a reduction
in our federal budget deficit. Unless productivity in the economy as
a whole is to dramatically increase above the recenttrendof1percent
orso-and unhappily there is no solid evidence for that-we will not
be able to close the gap in trade without slowing the growth in
domestic consumption well below the 4 percent pace it has averaged
during the current expansion.
The strong appreciation of the U.S. dollar, followed by its equally
strong depreciation, interacted with an economic recovery in the United
States characterized by:
1) faster growth of GNP than in partner countries;
2) faster growth of domestic demand than GNP;
3) decline of exports to indebted LDCs;
4) excess demand of savings requiring capital inflows;
5) high interest rates which stimulated those inflows;
6) lower productivity growth and higher import propensity than the
OECD average.
The above has resulted in an average growth ofreal imports that has
been twice that of exports and has led to a level of nominal imports
almost twice that of exports.
The position of the Japanese economy is the opposite:
1) slower growth of GNP than in the United States;
2) slower growth of domestic demand than GNP;
3) excess supply of savings requiring capital outflows;
4) lower import propensity than the OECD average.
The above has resulted in an average growth ofreal exports that has
been twice that of imports and has led to a level of nominal imports
two-thirds that of exports.
In Europe the reduction of fiscal deficits has been followed by de-
celeration ofgrowth, domestic demand, inflation, and employment and
has contributed to world trade imbalances.
To promote more balanced global growth, six countries (G-5 plus
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follow policies designed to strengthen domestic economy while main-
taining price stability, and deficit countries should encourage steady,
low inflation growth while reducing their domestic imbalances. Newly
industrializedeconomies" should assumegreaterresponsibilityfor pur-
suing policies thatallow theircurrencies to reflect morefully underlying
economicfundamentals." More explicitly, Germany and Japan pledged
to follow monetary and fiscal policies geared toward expanding do-
mestic demand, thus helping to reduce the external surplus.
To reduce existing imbalances, the adjustment process requires the
rest of the world economies to receive impulses broadly symmetrical
to thosein the United States. Underthepresentcircumstances I believe
it doubtful that stimulative policies in Japan and Germany could create
anexpansionofprivate demandofthe dimension needed to compensate
for the withdrawal ofpublic demandin the United States. To reestablish
balanced growth I see no alternative solution except redirecting flows
ofinternational capitaltodeveloping countries to relieve the constraints
to which they are submitted if they have to service foreign debt. The
rescheduling offoreign debt is a necessary condition; it is not a suffi-
cient condition.
If the United States succeeds in establishing equilibrium between
savings, investments, and budget deficits, if it moves from a position
of a net capital importer to a position of a net capital exporter and
therefore the trade deficit disappears and possibly a trade surplus ap-
pears, an excess in savings, in Keynesian terms, becomes manifest
worldwide. World demand is condemned to shrink and the ultimate
consequenceis stagnation. Notwithoutjustificationall forecasters have
already revised their forecasts for 1987 and onward: the EEC Com-
mission in its latest report has finally admitted that the contraction of
world markets necessarily influences negatively the prospects ofgrowth.
Coming back to the earth from the empyrean ofabsolute rationality,
it appears unlikely that a cheaper dollar will produce a dramatic re-
covery in the U.S. balance oftrade; a substantive upsurge ofAmerican
exports depends preponderantly on strong sales of capital goods and
industrial supplies to sluggish Europe and debt-burdened Latin Amer-
ica, and it is not likely to happen. As long as the United States avoids
recession and consumer goods demand continues growing, the trade
deficit will shrink little ifat all. As a result, protectionism-product by
product, country by country-will intensify.
I have expressed doubts about the possibility that the easing ofmon-
etary policies in Japan and Germany would boost the world economy
to the extent needed to reduce the balance oftrade deficit ofthe United
States. Expansionary policies, to be effective, need the United States
to accelerate its expansion too; but it seems that the Federal Reserve
could not take the risks ofmonetary expansion as long as it is worried143 Exchange Rate Coordination
by the combination ofthe falling dollar, large budget and trade deficits,
higher oil prices, and government disarray. Nor does it appear likely
that whenever the evil of recession looms near the Federal Reserve
will refrain from reluctantly taking a more accommodating stance.
The financial market appears to be scarcely affected by balance of
payment considerations; nor does it appear to be affected by fears of
interest rate hikes. What the market feels is that the industrial world
is awash in liquidity; in conditions in which productive factors and
products are in large supply, liquidity does not start prices rocketing;
it spills over into financial assets driving bonds higher, interest lower,
stocks higher.
Foreigners seem to be more eager to buy American stocks than to
buy American commodities, and this, to a certain extent, explains the
contradictions of the coexistence of a sluggish economy, a balance of
trade deficit, and a bull market fueled principally if not only by the
decline in interest rates.
A tide of money is foreseen to flow into stocks: the main sources
being pension funds, money marketfunds, companies that buy up their
own shares to oppose takeovers. Acquisitions and buyouts in 1986
totaled $267 billion; statistics published by the FederalReserveBulletin
show that funds raised by nonfinancial companies in the form ofshares
in the three years from 1984 to 1986 have been negative by an amount
of $226.1 billion.
In 1986 in most industrial countries monetary growth overshot its
targets. It occurred in the United States, in Britain, in Germany, in
France; the only country where the targets were respected was Japan.
In the OECD countries taken together broad money expanded in real
terms by 7 percent; it was the fastest rise since the early 1970s.
In the same period, globalization offinancial markets, deregulation,
and innovation all accentuated the creation of financial instruments
having a degree of liquidity similar to that of conventional money.
Reference Ranges in a Floating Exchange Rate System
In defining a correct patternfor the exchange rates ofthe U.S. dollar,
the Japanese yen, and the German mark, the various objectives should
be listed in order to establish the extent to which they are compatible
with each other. To declare that the exchange rate ofthe dollar has to
be fixed at a level that does not cripple American exporters implies
that it should not be influenced by capital movements and that the
United States does not need to import foreign capital to finance the
excess ofinvestment over disposable domestic savings after financing
the general government deficit. If the capital account is in surplus,
there must be an equivalent excess of imports of goods; somebody
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Projections of the savings-investment balance for the United States
and Japan in percentage ofGNP show that in the United States in 1987
private savings areestimatedat 16.4percentofGNP, privateinvestment
at 16.5, general government deficit at 3.4 percent; the result is a deficit
ofsavings of3.5 percent ofGNP that will be reverberated on an equiv-
alent surplus of the capital account and on an equivalent deficit ofthe
current account of the balance of payments; in money terms this is
calculated to be $140 billion.
Compare this to the position of Japan: private savings 34.2 percent
GNP; private investment 28.9 percent ofGNP; excess of savings over
investment 5.3 percent ofGNP; general government deficit of 1.0 per-
cent; surplus on current account 4.3 percent; in money terms: $79
billion.
Accepting the validity of such projections, decisions on the most
appropriate exchange rate of the yen to the dollar should be made
keeping in mind the limits of fluctuation that would offer Japanese
investors the prospect of an appropriate income. To that aim, interest
rate differentials playa major role; the greater the uncertainty about
the exchange rates, the greater the interest rate differentials should be.
The agreement between the United States and Japan to cooperate in
keeping exchange rate variations within "reference ranges" could be
interpreted as an offer to Japanese investors ofgreater protection against
exchange losses.
Ifit is generally agreed that the U.S. current account deficit in 1987
will be between $140 billion and $130 billion, that in 1988 it will be
reduced by $10-$20 billion, and that it will stabilize at around the $100
billion mark for the rest ofthe decade, the correct pattern ofexchange
rates to be aimed for should fit the conditions of a country in need of
foreign capital.
Upper and lower limits chosen as "reference ranges" without ade-
quate consideration oftheir credibility by private investors could pro-
duce the consequence that the function ofproviding funds to the coun-
tryin deficit ofsavings, insteadofbeingdischargedbyprivateinvestors,
would be discharged by central banks forced to support the exchange
rate within the limits of the "reference ranges" by selling their re-
spective currencies in exchange for the currency ofthe nation in need
offoreign capital. Alternatively, the full weight ofthe adjustment could
be placed on interest rate differentials.
The practical objective in choosing''reference ranges" should be to
restrict the risks ofinternational investors generated by the exchange
rate volatility. In recent years the markets have developed new instru-
ments that transfer risks from one economic agent to another, but they
do not eliminate the risks. By stabilizing the relationships between the
major currencies, the monetary authorities take risks themselves that145 Exchange Rate Coordination
the markets are unable to bear; at the same time they accepta limitation
of their monetary sovereignty.
At the meetings held in Paris, February 1986, the finance ministers
and the central bank governors ofthe G-5 and Canada reached a major
agreement to stabilize exchange rates around current levels.
The ministers agreed thatthe substantial exchange rate changes since
the September 1985 agreement to depress the dollar have "brought
their currencies within ranges broadly consistent with underlying eco-
nomic fundamentals." They concluded that the dollar's sharp decline
"will increasingly contribute to reduce external imbalances" and that
"further substantial exchange rate shifts among their currencies could
damage growth and adjustment prospects in their countries."
"Ouragreement is a temporary one. This is not a transition to a new
monetary order," stated the German Finance Minister.
During the fifteen years (1958-1973) in which the international mon-
etary system was based on fixed exchange rates, international coop-
eration worked satisfactorily. Contributing to its effectiveness were:
a) De facto acceptance of the hegemony of the United States; will-
ingness ofcountries like Germany and Italy to accumulate dollars
in their foreign exchange reserves and to support the dollar ex-
change rate by taking active partin the establishmentofa network
of swap agreements among central banks.
b) Constant improvement ofthe terms oftrade of the industrial na-
tions; limited size of external imbalances; recourse to demand
management policies; control of capital movements in order to
make monetary policies more autonomous.
c) Greater correlation between variations of monetary aggregates
and price levels; limited size offinancial instruments created out-
side the control of the monetary authorities and having a high
degree of substitution of money..
The imbalances that have developed in the three major industrial
nations since 1982 have no precedent and it is unlikely that they can
be corrected by exchange rate variations only. The globalization of
financial markets has helped to transfer savings from countries where
there is excess to the country where there is a deficit; at the same time
profound-'structural changes have taken place making the external po-
sition of the United States weaker. In particular:
1) excess production of foodstuffs in Europe and its position as a
major competitor of the United States as exporter of grains;
2) indebtedness of LDCs and the need ofLDCs to attain trade sur-
pluses to service the external debt;
3) loss of competitiveness of American manufactures and increase
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These factors will make the depreciation ofthe dollar less effective
in bringing about the adjustment process of the U.S. balance of pay-
ments on current account. If the projections of the possible evolution
of the trade deficit between now and the end of the decade prove to
be correct, the U.S. external debt will probably amount to 20 percent
of GNP. That could imply a heavy burden of interest payments to
foreign creditors on the external account and could result in severe
intermittent pressures on the dollar exchange rates and instability in
the international financial markets.
To avoid these detrimental consequences, the external deficit of the
United States needs to be put on a declining path, not one that turns
up again after 1989. But depreciation alone will not produce the effect
ofrectifying the external deficit; it could prove to be highly inflationary
for the U.S. economy; a resurgent U.S. inflation would make it almost
impossible to bring the trade account into balance.
To make the adjustment process ofthe existing payment imbalances
as orderly as possible, one important ingredient of international co-
operationis the supervisionofthe activities offinancial concerns (banks
and nonbanks). I do not imply thatcapital movements around the world
should be restricted as they were when fixed exchange rates operated.
What seems desirable is a higher degree ofcoordinated supervision on
thebehavioroffinancial marketsto strengthenthelinks betweenfinance
and the real economy.
The authors ofthe BrettonWoods agreements soughtto make finance
the servant and not the master of human desires in the international
as well as in the domestic sphere. U.S. Secretary of the Treasury
Morgenthau declared that he wanted to erect new institutions that
would be "instrumentalities of sovereign governments and not of pri-
vate financial interests"-in short, "to drive ... the usurious money
lenders from the temple ofinternational finance."
Ofcourse, the tide ofglobal financial markets, financial innovation,
and deregulation cannot be reversed; however, a higher degree of in-
ternational cooperation could reduce the risks associated with them
without throwing sand into the wheels of the markets.
Two problems concerning fundamentals cannot be solved by the
financial authorities; namely:
1) the distribution ofthe burden ofdefense between the United States
and Europe and its impact on central governments' expenditures;
the extent to which Japan could devote a higher proportion of its
resources to its own defense;
2) theindebtednessofLDCs and its consequences onthe rateofgrowth
inside these countries; here again the Western world is confronted
with a major political problem that profoundly affects social and
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Last but not least, more attention should be devoted to the different
ratios ofpopulation increase in the various parts ofthe world and their
impact on the distribution ofreal resources. The demographic balance
is likely to generate excess savings outside the United States and de-
ficient savings inside until the early years of the next century. This
means that the United States will be a net capital-importing country
during this period.
These are reflections ofan elder person who started his career as a
member ofthe Board ofDirectors ofthe IMP forty years ago and who
had to deal with the dismantling ofbilateral payment agreements, the
establishment of the European Payments Union, convertibility, fixed
exchange rates, floating exchange rates, dollar scarcity, and dollar glut.
I feel dazzled by the globalization of international markets, deregula-
tion, innovation; but I cannot help questioning the ability of these
changes to promote development, employment, monetary stability, and
a more equitable distribution ofwealth inside nations and among nations.
Note
This paper reflects the author's personal views on international cooperation in
exchange rate management, how things are evolving and which directions
should be taken in the future, based on personal past experience.
3. Jacques Attali
The Costs of Changing the International
Monetary System
It is very hard to speak after Mr. Carli, because I agree with almost
everything he said. Let me begin by addressing the issue of changing
international financial institutions, the topic on which Mr. Carli con-
cluded (see above).
I believe that we are now at the end of the second chapter in inter-
national finance since the Second World War. The conclusion of the
first chapter was marked by the collapse of the Bretton Woods agree-
ment, which in my view was terminated back in 1961, when it first
became clear that the dollar/gold parity could not be changed. I will
come back to this point later on, but for now let me say only that the
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the real end ofBretton Woods. Today we stand at the end ofthe period
ofgeneralized floating exchange rates.
Mr. Carli has clearly explained the history ofchange from Williams-
burg and Versailles. In the days following the Williamsburg agreement,
we spent the nights writing memoranda and communiques, formulating
agreements on how we would keep the markets in check. Perhaps we
were so satisfied by the prospect ofa new era ofcoordination that we
did not ask whether even coordinated intervention could be effective.
Our governments could agree to the central banks expending several
billion dollars, but in markets that saw a daily volume hundreds of
times as large. Yet an extraordinarily long fight against the political and
financial experts had to be fought before even these paltry sums could
be agreed upon. A main part ofmy message today is that such political
machinations-the meetings, the agreements, the press conferences-
are really just a shadow in front ofreality. They are nothing. They are
really just to keep TV on the air and to let the public think that their
leaders are actually dealing with the issue, when in fact they are not.
Not at all.
Nevertheless, there is a little hope to be found in a consensus that
seems to be emerging between the ideologues and the pragmatists. The
theoreticians, such as John Williamson, have built the ideaofreference
zones, which would be somethinglike a worldwide EuropeanMonetary
System. These theoreticians now find real consensus with the prag-
matists for three reasons that I can see.
The first reason for this unusual consensus comes from the funda-
mental ideaofBretton Woods, the real rootofwisdom that was perhaps
the only common ground shared by Harry Dexter White and John
Maynard Keynes: that you cannot have both free trade and free ex-
change rates. Either you have fixed exchange rates and free trade, or
you have protectionism with floating exchange rates. Today we see an
emerging consensus on this proposition, that the lack of discipline in
exchange rates is pushing the world toward increased protectionism.
The second area of consensus is that floating exchange rates tend to
channel finance toward speculation and away from long-term invest-
ments. I believe we will see more and more ofthis ifthe current system
is to survive. Such unbridled speculationjeopardizes the whole world-
wide economic system. The third area of consensus is that floating
exchange rates do not move to correct trade imbalances. Although the
theory held that exchange rates would fulfill such a function, they
clearly have not.
Thus I think that now, among the supposed decision makers around
the world, there is a consensus that something must change. Indeed,
beginning with the agreements ofthe last year, we have evolved in the
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That is, we have first an agreement between the G-7 countries to mon-
itor the main barometers of the economies. One must, of course, ask
what is on the list ofbarometers, and this is a very important question.
Is it only GDP? Is it inflation rate, interest rates, budget deficit? I am
sure that with time these will be better specified.
There also appears to be interest in choosing bands or target zones
that would hold currencies within a reasonable range ofvalues. While
the analysis here is not as advanced as that on macroeconomic barom-
eters, it is a start. Ofcourse there are many issues that must be settled
first. Which currencies shall we target? As far as Europe is concerned,
will it be the Deutsche mark or the European Currency Unit? Will the
targets be preannounced and public or implicit and secret? Will they
be "hard" or "soft"? Another issue is how much money we should
devote to intervention on the market.
But we do have this embryo. And I personally think that the next
few months or the next year will decide whether or not this embryo
develops. I believe this is the crucial time because we are facing the
moment when we have to move the current parities among rates. When
the parity must be changed, the question arises: Which is more costly
politically, changing the parameters or breaking the system?
This to me was one of the main mistakes of Bretton Woods, that it
was politically less costly to break the system than to change the pa-
rameters. The main asset ofthe European Monetary System, an asset
thatis integral to its construction, is the high cost politically for each
governmentin Europeto breakthe systemand the low costofaccepting
a realignment or change in the parameters. No reference zone system
can work ifthe political cost ofbreaking the system is not higher than
the political cost of changing the parameters.
Meanwhile a substantial, coordinated realignment of the major cur-
rencies of the world would be very costly. It is clear now that for the
German, Japanese, or American governments, the political costs of
breakingthe systemis nothing-zero. And the political costofchanging
the parameters is maybe higher because it has the appearance of a
political defeat.
Why is this so? Popular political support for a multilateral system
of target zones is simply very weak, especially in comparison with
important domestic political issues. I believe that it is impossible to
build a reference zone system without domestic political support. Such
a system is viable only when political leaders have to pay with their
own parochial popularity ifthey do not keep their word. An important
issue for the future is whether we can build this kind ofbasic political
supportfor target zones. As far as I amconcerned, we have little chance
in winning over the public if we are not bold enough first to make the
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be willing to announce not only modifications to domestic economic
policy that are made in the interest ofcoordination, but also the precise
bounds of the zone in which we agree exchange rates must lie. There
can be no political costs to breaking a reference zone agreement if the
zone itself is secret. And we must stress that leaders stick by their
word on international economic affairs. As it is, politicians find it costly
to change their word on matters ofdefense or arms control but not on
matters of international economic cooperation.
We have achieved a certain political foundation in Europe for the
European Monetary System. This, I believe, is really the most impor-
tant achievement of Europe in the past two decades. To bring this
success to the global level, we must develop it as an open, public issue,
an item of international debate. As far as the future is concerned, I
think that we must make the issue public, which means we make public
the fact that we need to have an increase in taxes in the United States
and growth in Japan and Germany. Ifwe do not take these steps, then
the whole system will be broken. Whether exchange rates are better
left within a generous band so that some semblance of floating still
exists, or whether rates should be fixed outright and the floating rate
system discarded altogether remains an open question, but I think it
is a subsidiary one. Ifwe succeed in raising these issues domestically,
I am sure that there will be a clear path for the future.
One obvious step along this path is to abandon the G-5 and G-7
frameworks·and go to the IMF. Let the IMF reinstate the surveillance
process it followed in the 1960s and resume its duties in managing and
coordinating parities. I have always been very skeptical ofthe idea that
exchange rate coordinationandtargetingcouldbeaccomplishedin such
small forums as the G-5 and G-7. We have to institutionalize a move
back to the larger multinational institutions, which were originally de-
signed precisely for these purposes.
Second, we have to include boththe Third World and Eastern Europe
in our negotiations. Clearly, we need in each country a leadership that
is penalized ifit does not respect that kind ofinternational agreement.
It is obvious that any such international agreement today would have
to address the fundamental imbalances directly and would therefore
have to stress an increase in taxes in the United States. This policy is
certainly risky, since it might trigger a recession in the United States
and perhaps around the world. But I view this as an outcomepreferable
to the scenario under which the United States does nothing to correct
its chronic fiscal deficits. This, I believe, would lead to crisis. The
United States simply cannot continue accumulating a large external
debt. We have already had one experience with this, and, as I have
said, it marked the end of the first chapter in postwar international
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In sum, I believe that if the leadership in the United States fails to
be bold enough, the costs of international economic linkages will be
very high in the future. I hope we can avoid paying that price.
4. John R. Petty
National Interests and Global Obligations: A Call
for Meaningful Dialogue
What we are talking about today is where economics and politics meet.
The adjustment process, especially when anything more is involved
than normal macro policies on a national basis, always probes and
sometimes penetrates deep into the structure oflocal economic inter-
ests-and therefore deep into local political alignments.
The mechanisms of international financial cooperation can some-
times blur this fundamental reality. Its smooth functioning minimizes
the pain. However, as balance ofpayments adjustment is delayed, new
economic patterns develop. With this delay, economic expectations
and political alignments quickly reflect these new circumstances. In
surplus countries especially, long or protracted deviations from the
norm in national accounts tend to compound resistance to adjustment.
The beneficiaries ofnew gains come to expect its continuance as their
economic birthright. Yet in a global sense, significant deviations from
the norm can only be enjoyed temporarily.
How might this traditional, and very human, reaction to achieving
economic advantage be countered? I will argue that for a starter what
is needed is a broaderappreciation ofwhat world economic equilibrium
requires. The intent is to encourage the development of expectations
that focus on the norms inherent in such a theoretical equilibrium. In
turn, this would help create a climate ofunderstanding to support the
political decisions necessary to move deviant national accounts back
toward the norm.
Too often, however, discussion ofinternational financial cooperation
moves quickly beyond the presumption ofsupport from political lead-
ership to dwell upon the niceties of the technical financial aspects of
one approach or another. The result is that the degree of political
backing necessary for a well-functioning international financial system
receives less attention than it deserves.
This is a serious shortcoming. Not only because it removes from the
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adjustment, but because it permits wishful thinking to prevail-the
impression that adjustment can be low cost, even free, and financial
coordination alone can do the trick.
Not surprisingly, politicians find it tempting to move quickly beyond
the questions of necessary political endorsement and active support.
Doing so allows them to sidestep issues. It tends to take them off the
hook.
This inadequate level oftop politicalinvolvementexists becausesuch
involvement has not been demanded except in crises, and leaders don't
go looking for points of friction. Moreover, a broad conceptual base
or framework is largely missing from the public debate on critical is-
sues. And the discussion we do have lacks the degree of specificity
necessary to get beyond generalities and into constructive dialogue.
For example, we seek a stable equilibrium with a constant variance.
But how much effort is spent going into what that means in terms of
national economies? We lack a consensus about where it is we want
to go. We lack a common understanding of what it is we are trying to
achieve and the compromises necessary to get there. Instead, too much
of the dialogue is directed toward the coordination of official foreign
exchange actions and exchange rate regimes.
The world lacks a commonly understood view of what constitutes,
approximately, an equilibrium environmentofthe global economy. This
means that not only does an underlying political consensus not exist
to support sufficiently the work ofeconomic and financial leaders, but
it is unlikely to be developed.
This lack of a shared view of what is desirable globally-and nec-
essary nationally-robs us of more progress toward a happier global
economic environment. Advisers to presidents, prime ministers, and
legislators speak mostly of national interest; too little is said ofglobal
obligations. And, ofcourse, national interests prevail. True, more often
than not flagrant excesses of national policy measured against the
obligations of a multilateral system are avoided. But more than that is
required. After all, we admit to being an interdependent world.
To begin the long process ofshifting more emphasis ofnational gov-
ernments toward explicitly recognizing and responding to global obli-
gations, we should commence a deliberate program. Our first step
should be to define, roughly, what constitutes a sustainable balance of
payments equilibrium on a global basis. As the second step, a debate
should be encouraged on the outcome. Our trading partners too must
have their own internal debate. Clear recognition should be given to
what would be involved for each nation to operate within the relevant
constant variances.
I do not deceive myself that this will be easy. The illusion that it is
possible to pursue independent monetary policy and decidedly national
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Yet this conceptual framework, this global vision with reasonably
compatible national economic expression, would provide credibility,
encouragement, and assistance to advocates in national governments
who seek to pursue national programs consistent with a sustainable
global model.
It is a long road. And that is why we should start now.
The remainder of this paper will describe (1) how we might create
this framework within our multilateral system; (2) how we might ap-
proach obtaining the political as well as the financial endorsements
necessary to make theframework the lynchpinofourglobal adjustment
mechanism; and (3) certain reinforcing rules designed to encourage
good behavior.
Our first objective should be to define a reasonably sustainable equi-
libriummodel in the world trade andpayments. This wouldentaila tech-
nically executed, but increasingly politically led, multilateral effort to
explore, and then attempt to define, what national accounts would look
like in a global equilibriummovement. Nevermind thatsucha condition
among nations is more theoretical than real and that the quantification
of trade balance and current accounts objectives by nations would be
more illustrative than a national intention, certainly at first.
Such a recommended objective, for example, would tend to stir
debate on what level of Japanese trade surplus is sustainable-sus-
tainable, that is, in terms of multilateral equilibrium and compatible
goals among nations. We can all agree that the Japanese trade surplus
should be nowhere near4-5 percent ofGDP. But what number is most
appropriate as a target? Current account composition and size would
certainly also be part of the debate.
Thinkofthe valueofa comparablediscussionaboutthe UnitedStates
which related the size and duration of the federal deficit and foreign
capital flow to what is necessary in the trade balance of the future.
To illustrate: If the United States shifted to a trade surplus at the
rate of 2 percent of GNP per year, starting in 1988, we would be in
surplus in 1989; the external debt would peak at $440 billion.
If the shift took place at the rate of 1 percent of GNP per year,
starting in 1988, we would be in surplus in 1991, and the external debt
would peak at $580 billion.
Ifthe shift was at the rate of 1/ 2 percent ofGNP (a $22 billion annual
improvement), starting in 1988, we would be in surplus in 1995, and
the external debt would peak at almost $1,000 billion.
The interest cost of servicing the debt at 7 percent would be 0.6
percent, 0.7 percent, and 0.9 percent ofGNP, or roughly 0.5-1.0 per-
centofGNP in the form ofa trade surplus would be required to service
the external debt (assuming a constant relative level of debt).
The implication of these numbers is profound and worthy of much
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Creating a hypotheticalglobal modelwould bring to the surface many
such issues. A few such models do exist, and they no doubt generate
subjects of discussion too.
To some extent, there is an interesting historical precedent to this
approach, though the precedent was far more limited in the breadth of
its exposure. At Working Party 3 ofthe OECD in the 1968-69 period,
efforts were made to define national balance of trade and current ac-
count goals in the context ofa global environment. Initially the United
States was offered as the residual in the equation and LDCs were for
the most part ignored. As the exercise was repeated every six weeks,
and participants began to think oftheir goals in terms more compatible
with a sustainable global framework, objectives were moderated some-
what. When the United States was presented on other than a residual
basis (i.e., a nation that had objectives too) and the LDCs were given
trade goals compatible with their debt service and growth needs, the
exercise reached its practical limits at that time. But it was far from
useless.
The disparity between what nations wanted and what the system
ideally should have was so great that technical level discussions begged
for political determinations. In a way, they got it. The real impact of
the exercise may never have been noted: The death knell of the "ad-
justable peg" exchange rate system was tolled. The Working Party 3
work demonstrated to some in the U.S. Treasury that a discrete de-
valuation of the dollar against our trading partners was not going to
happen normally. Analysis alone would not occasion other nations to
accept the loss of their trade advantage to the dollar. This began the
search for the time and the mechanism by which the United States
could achieve a discrete devaluation, not simply a devaluation against
gold with no trade advantage. In fact, this was the background to
August 15, 1971.
Our task today of finding a mechanism is simpler. We have much
increased flexibility in our exchange rate system. We have increased
habits of financial cooperation, even coordination. And we have the
Economic Summits which provide a critical cog in the multilateral
machinery. These Summits are the avenue to obtaining over time the
more explicit political endorsement necessary if national actions are
to conform to international behavioral requirements. It may be several
years before this point is reached, butthe benefits ofthis type ofintense
consultation begin to accrue much sooner. The Tokyo Round decla-
ration and the presumed work underway is a beginning. How much
political will lies behind that effort remains to be seen.
Today the exploration, and then the description, of national trade
and current account goals might initially be pursued through any of a
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constant variances on a national basis. Clearly, fundamental local and
national economic interests are involved and I do not minimize the
task.
This work shouldbebroughttogetherandgivenintegrity andcredibil-
ity under the auspices of the IMF. This would provide institutional
support and, ideally, formal political endorsement in due course through
becoming part of the five-year IMF Quota Review process. By tying
the process in with the quota review negotiations, we get the necessary
balance between continuity and adjustability in goals in a changing
world.
The framework, which is an amalgam of reasonably compatible na-
tional goals, must be reinforced through the multilateral institutions
with encouragement for good performance and a remedy for neglect.
It is necessary to stimulate again a most active discussion about
enforcement mechanisms, pointed to the surplus countries equally as
to the deficit countries. Good behavior will need to be encouraged, and
negligent behavior-behavior that ignores responsible participation in
the multilateral system-will have to be vulnerable to denials that will
tend to induce cooperation.
Is adjustment too slow? Do all the dynamic new elements ofmodern-
day trade and investment overwhelm the adjustment mechanism when
achieved only, orprimarily, through macroeconomic stimulants to wage
and price levels? Do we allow political forces of protection too much
time to gather? Are early warning systems enough?
Earlier involvement of political leadership has to be our objective.
Righting imbalances sooner is the best way to expand support for the
multilateral system. Too little study has been given to the impact of
slow versus fast adjustment. There is not enough recognition of the
threat of too slow a response. Has the academic community demon-
strated to the politicians the cost of delayed action? Should they not
be shown it is not cost free?
The scarce currency clause must be revisited and active consider-
ation must be given to what is necessary to make it an effective tool
ofcompliance. Respectable people should no longer avoid meaningful
discussions about the "scarce economy" clause or its equivalent.
Besides the IMF, the GATT too has a little-used mechanism designed
to pressure the surplus country: the quota privilege ofthe deficit coun-
try. While accepting the idea of negative inducements, an alternative
to quotas must be found. Withholding tariff concessions previously
granted might be the approach. This could be done selectively. The full
discipline of multilateral machinery must assure both the reasonable-
ness and the temporary nature of any such action. Discipline also
requires multilateral bodies to assure that deficit countries do not shirk
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mechanisms (scarce currency and withholding tariff concessions)
meaningful possibilities, more symmetry would be brought to the sys-
tem. They could deter or limit unsportsmanlike conductjust as deficit
countries get credits ifthey play by the rules. As in all deterrents, their
mere existence and credibility provide more value to the multilateral
system than their usage.
Moreover, having these surplus country inducements only makes
sense where national expectations are both understood and accepted.
That is, where the framework-the constant variance vision ofa stable
world environment-identifies when responsible actions must be taken
in conjunction with other off-variant nations. The IMF, the press, and
the international financial community would help to communicate these
instances, and the discussion I am looking for should help create a
public understanding of what needs to be done.
Gaining clear political endorsements nationally of the implications
ofaccepting a global economic framework will not be easy. It may not
be fully possible. It certainly will not happen quickly. But the exercise
has intrinsic merit:
It will educate the participants and many others.
It will stimulate discussions and tend to focus debate on the impli-
cations of adjustment.
Itwill influence policymakers in the right direction, evenifthey won't
admit it.
All of these things will create an environment more hospitable to
tough political decisions.
Ofitself, the process will build further the framework ofcooperation
betweennations andwith the multilateral institutions. The coordination
of monetary policy, intervention, and economic programs would be
greatly facilitated by the process of building this framework and de-
veloping the consensus. As the relative size ofthe world economic pie
forces more choices, the benefits of this cooperation will encourage
the political determinations which ultimately are inescapable.
5. Robert Solomon
Exchange Rates, Macroeconomic Policies, and
the Debt Problem
We have heard three very interesting talks. It's clear that the topic of
international financial policy is not really distinguishable from mac-
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speakers have talked about macro policies, understandably. The nar-
rower definition of this panel might have seemed to refer to exchange
rates in particular. The excellent background paper written by Dick
Marston (see above) does focus on exchange rate policies. I'll start
with that subject and then broaden out a bit to the more general.
On exchange rate policies in particular, I shall say a few words about
the Paris agreement (or perhaps we should call it the Louvre agreement
to maintain a certain parallelism with the Plaza). It was not long ago
that the G-6 met in Paris and agreed to stabilize the exchange rates
against the dollar, on the grounds that rates had somehow reached
levels that reflect underlying fundamentals. Most economists would
disagree with thatjudgment. Most economists, not all, believe that the
exchange rate adjustment that's been going on since March 1985 needs
to go further. One of the reasons it needs to go further is that if you
look at the extent of the dollar depreciation in real terms against the
other industrial countries and the developing countries (I'm using the
Morgan Guarantee Index, which includes about eighteen developing
countries and twenty-two industrial countries), the dollar has moved
back only about three-fourths of the way to where it was in 1980. In
otherwords only three-fourths ofthe appreciation of1980-85 has been
reversed. While there is nothing sacred about the year 1980 or any
otherbase, the U.S. currentaccount was more orless balanced in 1980.
As a couple of speakers have already pointed out here, the string of
current account deficits that the United States has incurred so far in
this decade, andwill continueto incurbefore thecurrentaccountdeficit
disappears, will change the net investment position by $700-$800 bil-
lion. Using an interest rate of 7 percent, one comes out with a net
increase in interest payments of something like $50 billion. Ifwe want
to get our current account back to where it was in 1980, we need an
extra $50 billion oftrade surplus. Now one could argue that the United
States should have a surplus on current account, not just a balance,
given the need for resource flows to the developing countries.
For these reasons, to put it all very briefly, there is a case for ad-
ditional depreciation ofthe dollar beyond where it has gone so far. Yet
we had this agreement in Paris to stabilize the exchange rates. The
question: Why did those six sets offinance ministers and central bank
governors make that agreement? Why in particular did the Americans
agree to it?
The only explanation that I can come up with is that Secretary Baker
and Chairman Volcker were worried about the shock to the economies
of the other industrial countries of the exchange rate adjustment that
has occurred so far. They're worried about too slow growth, if not
recession, in Germany and Japan, and they came to the judgment that
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to provide some time for the other countries to adopt domestic demand
policies so that they can compensate for the contraction in aggregate
demandresultingfrom thefall-offin theirexternalsurpluses. I therefore
regard the Paris agreement as a temporary one providing only for a
pause.
I'll now say a word or two about target zones ifI may. Some people
have interpreted the Paris agreement as being a first step toward a
target zone system. Whetherone agrees with that or not doesn't matter
for present purposes. We could spend an entire session ontarget zones.
I wouldjust very briefly state what I regard as the nub ofthe objection
to the target zone system in present-day circumstances.
The point is that fiscal policy is immobilized in the United States,
and it's almost immobilized in the other major industrial countries. If
we went to a target zone system, how would countries respect those
target zones? We know, and Dick Marston's paper makes the point
very well, that sterilized intervention is a rather weak instrument for
regulating exchange rates. So it would have to be monetary policy.
Unsterilized intervention, which is equivalent to monetary policy, would
have to be used to hold exchange rates within the target zones.
Since we cannot at present flex fiscal policy very much in any of
the industrial countries, we would be linking monetary policy to the
exchange rate. Such a monetary policy would not always be the ap-
propriate policy for domestic stabilization, therefore, we would be
giving up domestic stability in order to try to achieve stability of
exchange rates. And that does not seem to me to be a very sensible
trade-off.
In my view the reform that we need before we try to reform the
exchange rate system is a reform of fiscal policy in all the major in-
dustrial countries, which is desirable for its own sake.
Let me now talk a little bit about the macroeconomic interactions
between developing countries and industrial countries. It seems to me
this hasn't received quite enough attention, even in JeffSachs's paper
(see above), if I read that paper properly. It is not well enough rec-
ognized that the weakness in the industrial countries in the past year,
1986, is partly the resultofvery weak import demand in the developing
countries.
The developing countries suffered a severe terms of trade deterio-
ration in 1985-86. Not only the oil-exporting countries, which we all
know about, but the non-oil developing countries also suffered a very
severe deterioration in their terms oftrade and they all had to cut back
on their imports. And that cutback in the imports of the developing
countries reduced the GNP of the industrial countries. The OECD
Outlook for December 1986 estimates that effect at 1 percent of the
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omies ofthe industrial countries have weakened. Governor Carli (see
above) has pointed out the latest assessment of the European Com-
mission, which shows a fairly slow growth in Europe; they cut the
estimate for 1986 back to 2.5 percent, and they estimate 1987 at 2.3
percent.
We have a situation where the developing countries cuttheir imports,
weakening growth in the industrial countries. The weaker growth in
the industrial countries makes conditions worse in developing coun-
tries. We have a vicious circle going on between the developing and
the industrial countries. I don't think that point has received enough
attention at this meeting so far.
There is a corollary to what I've said. We know that exports have
slowed in Germany and Japan and maybe other industrial countries.
This is usually attributed to the exchange rate change that has occurred
in the last two years. It is just possible that some ofthat slowdown in
export growth in industrial countries is not yet the reflection of the
exchange rate, but it may be a reflection of the weak performance of
the developing countries, and we may still have ahead ofus the affects
of the exchange rate adjustment. Consider that as a possibility. Some
mixture of exchange rates and weakness in the developing countries
is what's going on here.
The challenge is to convert this vicious circle into a virtuous circle.
That leads me to two sorts ofrecommendations. Being the last speaker
ofthis program, I will take advantage ofthat position to set out broad
policy recommendations.
Number one: It's conventional wisdom that to correct the imbalance
of international payments and current account positions in the world,
the United States should be cutting back on its domestic demand and
the countries in surplus should be speeding up the growth of their
domestic demand. The United States should do it, ofcourse, by cutting
its budget deficit. How the other countries should speed up their do-
mestic demand is usually not specified as clearly. The general principle
is widely respected, though it hasn't been activated very much in prac-
tice. The U.S. budget deficit is going down this fiscal yearby something
like 1 percent ofGNP. It's rather uncertain so far what will happen in
the next fiscal year. Ideally, it would go down by 1 percent of GNP
each year and it would be gone by 1990 or so.
What I would like to suggest is that while we all accept what has to
be done on both sides, maybe the emphasis has to be shifted a little
bit, given the weakness of total demand in the industrial world, and
given this vicious circle that I was referring to. I would say we need
to put more emphasis on increasing domestic demand in the surplus
countries and a little bit less emphasis, not zero, but a little bit less
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that emphasis a little bit and not put them on a par, simply because
the world economy, and the outlook for the world economy, is so
sluggish. If that were done and we did get a net increase in domestic
demand in the industrial world as a whole-including the United States
and Europe andJapan-thatwould beone step toward tryingto convert
this vicious circle into a virtuous circle.
There is one other measure that would be needed. We would have
to find a way to increase the flow of capital from the industrial to the
developing countries, becausethe developing countries need more than
better terms oftrade and a faster growth in their exports so that those
that are potentially creditworthy will appear that way. The developing
countries also need a net increase in capital inflow, or they need to
reduce the net capital transfers that they are making to the rest ofthe
world, so that they can increase their investment, which, as we all
know, is too low.
If we could somehow find a financial technique for increasing the
flow ofcapital to the developing countries so that the developing coun-
tries could increase their imports, that stimulus to demand in industrial
countries would be much more welcome, somehow, than an increase
in domestic demand that comes from cutting taxes. Fiscal policy is just
not a very popular instrument of policy in those countries that are in
surplus, and it's not usable in the United States in an expansionary
way. But I have no doubt that an increase in exports would be quite
welcome in Europe and Japan. One way to bring that about is to try
to find a way to get a bigger flow ofcapital to the developing countries.
I'm not going to suggest precisely how that can be done, because I
don't know. But I would say that the routes that are worth exploring
go beyond the commercial banks. I have great doubts that we can
expect very much increase in lending--concerted lending, as it's called-
to the developing countries in the present circumstances.
The thought that goes through my mind is that the way to try to
encourage a flow of capital to those developing countries that are po-
tentially creditworthy (I'm leaving out Africa here, talking about ba-
sically the Baker-I5 countries) is through some form of partial guar-
antee that would encourage a flow ofportfolio capital to the developing
countries. That seems tome to be the one source that has some po-
tential, since one has to rule out the banks, and direct investment itself
can't do the trick. Part ofthe rationale for looking to portfolio capital
as a way to get funds into the developing countries is that the United
States has been absorbing portfolio capital from other countries with
its current account deficit.
The U.S. current account deficit will go down in the next three or
four years. It already started down in real terms in the fourth quarter.
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capital diminishes, perhaps the countries that have been exporting cap-
ital to the United States can be induced to shift portfolio capital to the
developing countries, where it's obviously badly needed.
Summary of Discussion
Anthony Solomon began by expressing his pessimism about the long-
term effectiveness ofcoordinated intervention. He agreed with Guido
Carli that if both surplus and deficit countries acted in concert, the
benefits would be large. But such coordination is unlikely, and, by
default, the dollar will continue to fall. He argued that as financial
markets become more integrated, shocks to the systemwill increasingly
require capital controls. Failures in the ability to coordinate may imply
the need for capital controls in thefuture. Solomon expressed a gloomy'
view of the outlook for the future. He felt that even with a further
decline ofthe dollar, adjustments in the underlying balances would be
slow. The falling U.S. terms oftrade and the more restrictive monetary
policy that would be required would also imply future constraints on
U.S. growth.
Feldstein gave additional evidence on intervention by the Central
Bank of Japan. Official accumulation of U.S. assets by the Bank of
Japan was $15 billion and $16 billion in the second and third quarters
of1986, respectively. The total for 1986 was $36 billion, approximately
half ofJapan's current account surplus.
Marston asked if this intervention was monetized. If not, then he
was skeptical that, even with figures this large, the intervention had
much effect on the yen/dollar exchange rate. Feldstein agreed that
sterilized intervention does not generally matter. He had offered these
figures to demonstrate both the magnitude and duration of recent in-
tervention by Japan. Butifone believed that foreign governments were
prepared to finance the U.S. current account deficit for a sustained
period of time, it would seem likely that the dollar would fall more
slowly. He pointed out that private investors would be able to swap
out of dollar assets if the Bank of Japan were able to finance U.S.
deficits indefinitely, however unlikely that possibility may be.
Marston noted that ifwe were to move to fixed rates, capital controls
would be required. First, to reachagreed-upon targets, monetary policy
would have to be used. Second, each country would be forced to
subordinate its own domestic growth targets. It is unlikely either that
the United States would persevere orthat other countries would follow
U.S. monetary policies in order to preserve the targets. Third, the
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extensive capital controls. Indeed, even though the Europeans have
broadly coordinated theirmonetary policies, the real secretofthe EMS
lies in the capital controls on France and Italy. To make target zones
work, less financial integration is required.
Attali objected, saying that capital controls need not be so stringent
ifthere is a credible agreement to adjust fundamental policies. Capital
controls may not always be unappealing, especially when the alter-
native is a large increase in protectionism. One should not disregard
the gains that accrue merely from putting a credible system of target
zones in place. The EMS was built with capital controls and now is
strong enough for their removal. An important feature of the EMS is
that the cost of getting out of the system is currently higher than the
cost of adjusting parities.
Marston noted that each time there is a crisis within the EMS, the
Eurofranc interest·differential reacts. Thus capital controls buy time
to make the necessary adjustments of EMS parities, and in this sense
they are essentialto the functioning ofthe system. The reason the EMS
cannot be generalized to the rest ofthe world without far more restric-
tive capital controls is that other central banks are unlikely to follow
the Fed as closely as the Europeans follow the Bundesbank.
De MenU strongly disagreed with this point ofview. The interest rate
gaps to which Marston referred are temporary. The delay in adjust-
ments is becoming even shorter as capital controls are relaxed. He
emphasized that it was incorrect to point toward the EMS as a reason
why exchange rate targets cannot work for the world. The EMS works
because of the dominance and credibility of German monetary policy
in Europe. The capital controls issue is a red herring. If target zones
are not successful, it will be for political and not economic reasons.
Carli pointed out that we cannot expect foreign exchange markets
to be more orderly unless a more serious attempt is made to regulate
financial activities all over the world. Ifmonetary coordination is going
to be the centerpiece of a reference zone system, we must guarantee
that the monetary authorities have controls over various financial in-
stitutions, banks and nonbanks.
Marston added that the EMS is far from a fixed rate system: the
Frenchfranc has been cumulatively devalued by 38 percent against the
Deutsche mark since the inception of the EMS. In his view the main
issue is world policy coordination. Without such coordination, capital
controls would be needed.
Sachs presented another view. Now, as in earlier episodes, we will
get coordination, but this coordination will not be desirable. Most prior
attempts at global policy coordination have failed. At the Genoa con-
ference of 1922, there was general agreement about the return to the
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a worldwide shortage of liquidity by the end of the 1920s and was a
prelude to the Great Depression. Bretton Woods fared much better
partly by historical accident and partly because of the dominance of
the U.S. economy at the time. The Smithsonian agreement, however,
lasted only fifteen months. During this period the greatest excess of
world liquidity since the Potosi silver mine in the sixteenth century led
to the collapse offixed rates. The 1980-81 worldwide monetary tight-
ening was initially hailed as the reversal ofthis tendency toward excess
liquidity. In each of these cases, countries bought into a single set of
undiversified monetary policies, and often the policies turned out to
be eitherexcessive orwrong. Floating rates provide diversification and
can help stagger business cycles across countries. The relatively un-
even growth record of the United States over the last decade can be
compared with Japan's more even growth. For most ofthis period, the
Japanese did not look to the United States to set their monetary policy.
Thus, while there may be some gains to coordination in terms of re-
ducing the volatility of exchange rates, the cost is that all countries
must buy into a single set ofbeliefs, which are sure to be wrong some
of the time.
Gains to coordination also depend crucially on the importance of
transmission effects across countries. Sachs's research indicates that,
under floating rates, monetary policy generates negligible transmission
effects, whereas the effects of fiscal policy coordination are large. A
monetary expansion depreciates the home currency while increasing
income enough to fully offset any positive effects on the trade balance
from the depreciation. Divergent monetary policies, therefore, do not
require coordination. Given the current situation, Sachs also felt that
we do not need coordinated fiscal policies; better fiscal policies would
suffice.
Robert Solomon expressed the view that if West Germany joined a
reference zone system with the United States in the 1980s, the Bundes-
bank would have to adapt its policy to the Fed. The German monetary
authorities currently exercise great power within the EMS and, con-
sequently, are not very enthusiastic about subordinating their present
autonomy to a world target zone system.
With this, Branson disagreed. First, he argued that target zones
would not have worked in the 1980s because ofthe U.S. fiscal position,
not the reticence ofGerman monetary authorities. Ifthe United States
had honored an exchange rate target, a large expansionary monetary
policy would have been required in theearly 1980s. Sucha policy would
have been politically unacceptable at that time. Second, target zones
would also require coordination offiscal policies. Branson thought that
the literature on optimal currency areas could shed some light on the
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the parities. There is an old and unresolved debate in economics over
whether the whole world ought to be a single currency area. Charles
Kindleberger, for example, has argued thatthe world should be a single
area, while Max Corden wonders if Brittany is already too big for a
single currency. In practice, however, the distinction is not so clear.
A fixed rate system in which the parities are adjusted frequently and
costlessly is not really a fixed rate system at all. Finally, Branson
responded to a remark made earlier by Anthony Solomon, that many
economists such as Paul Krugman and Charles Schultze have predicted
that in five years the United States will have balanced merchandise
trade, and that this seems to imply that the change will be both rapid
and relatively painless. Branson stated that, while many economists
are supportive of continued dollar depreciation, they do not believe
that it will lead either to an abrupt orpainless improvement in the trade
balance.
Pratt was asked how multinationals would respond to capital con-
trols. Would each subsidiary be forced to conduct its own financing
separately?Prattrespondedthatthis has longbeenPfizer'spolicy. Even
in the absence of capital controls, currency risks can most easily be
hedged by issuing liabilities denominated in the host-country's cur-
rency. Petty agreed, adding that since most corporations now treat their
financing arms as profit centers, capital controls would have little effect
on direct investment. Capital controls are not new, and most multi-
nationals long ago learned how to mitigate the costs such controls
impose.
McNamar felt that the day that U.S. trade reaches balance is more
than five years off. The capital inflows will persist, partly because
institutional investors find little that is attractive in the EC or Japan.
There are few new start-ups with prospects for high growth. Indeed,
with the dollar depreciation and improving U.S. competitiveness, the
U.S. marketstill looks mostattractive. Greenspan addedthatportfolios
are already skewed toward dollar-denominated assets, and thatforeign
residents will stop funding the U.S. current account deficit at some
point. Only then will the current account reach balance.
Kunihiro admitted it is often said that the shortage of investment
opportunities is responsible for the capital outflow from Japan to New
York. There are attempts being made in Japan to resolve this, however,
in addition to increasing fiscal spending on social investments. One of
these attempts is in so-called third sector participation projects, such
as the Konsai Airport, the Tokyo Bay Bridge, and building projects.
The government is trying to siphon private money to these public
projects, and this strategy is likely to become even more popular.
Kunihiro also held that the ranges for exchange rates discussed at the
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that further dollar depreciation will lead to inflation and higher interest
rates in the United States.
Ruggiero suggested several ways to reduce the present imbalances
while maintaining sufficient world growth. First, increases in aggregate
demand in West Germany and Japan are needed, but they cannot alone
be the solution. An adjustment by the newly industrialized countries
would be helpful, but still not sufficient. Without an improvement in
the U.S. saving/investment imbalance, we cannot solve our problems.
Second, Ruggiero argued that more resources must be made available
to LDCs. Third, exchange rates need to be made more stable. To do
this, perhaps compatible rather than highly coordinated policies are
necessary.
Richardson noted the underlying belief in the discussion so far that
exchange rates matter in real economic decisions. He agreed, but re-
corded several facts that cast doubt on this view. Over several-year
periods, exchange rates are not readily correlated with commodity
prices, with trade volumes, with overall price levels, or with cross-
border capital formation and investment. Perhaps these facts are con-
sequences of the behavior of multinationals as described by Pratt and
Blumenthal. Could it be that prudent financial management has made
real economic decisions less sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations?
The discussion then turned to the lagging response ofthe trade bal-
ance to the depreciation ofthe dollar. Greenspan noted the very rapid
changes in foreign exporter's profit margins. He speculated that more
volatile profit margins could be responsible for the recent stubbornness
ofthe trade deficit. Branson added that the J-curve isjust now starting;
during the six quarters following the dollar's peak, import quantities
actually increased. Schultze commented that in its early stages a de-
preciation may affect profit margins on inelastic goods disproportion-
ately, so that a small quantity response is observed.
Schultze also reflected on whether an exchange rate commitment
could be expected to change policy behavior. He felt that this is a
political proposition. To be successful, he argued, it is necessary to
coordinate both monetary and fiscal policies. Schultze reiterated his
view that the instruments ofpolicy often become goals in themselves.
The current U.S. fiscal stanceis an excellent illustration. Ifinstruments
themselves become goals, a political willingness for and commitment
to coordination is essential if coordination is ever to be successful.
Robert Solomon pointed out that our thinking about the J-curve is
somewhat simplistic. When parities are fixed, it may be appropriate to
ask how a single, discrete devaluation affects the trade balance over
time. But the dollar has experienced a continuous two-year deprecia-
tion, so that the corresponding J-curve effect is an envelope ofsimple
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during the conference about European unemployment, which is one of
the mostcostlyproblems confrontingtheindustrializedcountries today.
Attali projected into the future. He felt that if the world retains a
floating rate system political disaster will result. If, on the other hand,
exchange rate target zones are adapted, we will have a recession as
the United States makes the necessary adjustment to its trade imbalance.
Carli reflected that global financial markets are outside the control
ofthe authorities. In response, central banks must devise longer term
cooperative strategies if sensible exchange rates are to be maintained.
In the present circumstances, this will require leading central banks to
finance the U.S. current account deficit and to accumulate U.S. assets.
Otherwise, Carli felt, the system will collapse.
Feldstein was asked to summarize his views for the Sherpas in the
upcoming Economic Summit. He stressed that the key challenge for
this Summit meeting is to formulate a strategy that avoids the adverse
effects of unwinding the U.S. trade balance deficit. Import quantities
have begun to fall, so we have turned the corner. But he stressed that
even with public sector support, sufficient funding for the current ac-
count deficit at the current level ofthe dollar will not be forthcoming.
Instead, the dollar must depreciate enough to eliminatethe tradedeficit,
and this will require a further 20 percent fall in its value. Feldstein
noted that surplus countries, such as Japan, which has a current ac-
count surplus ofover3percent ofGNP, will sustain substantial damage
unless domestic demand fills the void. With this situation as a back-
ground, he made three recommendations. First, the U.S. budget must
be cut, and here not enough progress has been made. But regardless
of the fiscal situation, the trade deficit will fall. In the not-so-distant
future, the United States will have to run a trade balance surplus to
service its external debt. Second, immediate steps must be taken to
expand monetary and fiscal policy in West Germany and Japan. Gov-
ernments need to anticipate the ultimate effects ofthe currentexchange
rate change. Third, expansion in West Germany and Japan is not an
alternative to a decline of the dollar. Expansion is to maintain or in-
crease employment in Europe and Japan, while the dollar must fall to
achieve external balance. It would be a mistake if the Summit repeats
the message from the Louvre agreement that the dollar has already
reached an appropriate level. Such a message will encourage the wrong
kinds of macro policies in the surplus countries. A falling dollar will
help remind these countries that there will be further pain from current
account adjustments in the absence of more stimulative macroeco-
nomic policies.